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L8i] 
LETTER 



FROM THE 

ACTING SECRETARY OF WAR : 

i 

TRANSMITTING 

g, INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE CLAIMS 



OP 



THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 

FOR 

PAYMENT OF THE EXPENSES 

OF 

THE MILITIA., 

QRDEUED OUT BY THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 0* THE STATE. 

DURING THE LATE WAR. 



February 20, 1817. 

Read, and ordered to lie upon the table. 



WASHINGTON: 



PRINTED BY E. DE KRAFF I 

1618. 



<s 



<\ 






NOV 1905 
D. of D, 






[81] 



* 



Department of War, 

February 18th, 1817. 

SIR, 

In obedience to the resolution of the House of Representatives of 
the lith instant, directing the Secretary of "War " to lay before the 
House any information in the possession of that Department relative to 
the claims of the state of Massachusetts, for payment of the expenses 
of the militia ordered out by the executive authority of the state, 
during the late war," I have the honor to transmit the enclosed docu- 
ments. That marked A, is a copy of the communication, with the 
accompanying documents, made to this Department by James Lloyd, 
and William Ji. Sumner, esquires, agents on the part of the state of 
Massachusetts. B, is a copy of the answer given by this Department 
to that communication; and C, is a copy of a communication made 
by the Secretary of War to the chairman of the Military Committee 
of the Senate, on the 7th of February, 1815, with the accompanying 
locumenfs. 

I have the honor to be, 

AVith great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

GEO. GRAHAM, 

Acting Secretary of War, 

'The honorable Henry Clay, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 



pi] 



(A.) 

SIR, 

In the conferences we have had the honor to have with you, in 
relation to the claim of the state of Massachusetts, lor expenses in- 
curred, and supplies furnished, for the service of the militia of that 
state, for the general security and protection dining the late war, with 
the adjustment of which claim we have been charged, it has been our 
wish, as we have before made known to you, to conduct the examina- 
tion and settlement of the account with the respect and deference al- 
ways due to the highest public functionaries of the nation, and to 
pursue that course, which, while it would do justice to the state we 
en this occasion have the honor to represent, would also best com- 
port with the convenience and wishes of the executive of the United 
States, to whom, in the first instance, we considered it most proper 
to apply. 

\Ve understand, from the laws passed in the years 1795 and 1S1 V, 
authorizing, under certain circumstances, detachments ot the militia 
on the requisition of the President of the United States, that the ex- 
penses incurred in consequence of such requisitions, have been liqui- 
dated and paid by the general government; and that where the militia 
has been ordered by state authority into service, without the request 
of the President, and the occasion has, in the opinion of the execu- 
tive of the United States, justified the call for their services, that a 
subsequent recognition has been considered as equal to a previous 
requisition; and that on this construction of the powers gi\en, by the 
laws before mentioned, to the President, very large claims have been 
admitted and paid, in whole or in part, either by advances or on final 
adjustment, to several of the states who have presented them. 

On this ground, therefore, and justly presuming on the distribu- 
tion ot that equal and exact justice to all the members of this great 
family of states, which alone could furnish the vital principle of their 
union, and which undoubtedly will govern the conduct of the general 
government on this and on all other occasions, we have hoped, that 
the account we had the honor to present would have been admitted, 
at least to an investigation on its merits; and that, as the simplest and 
most easy method of examination that presented itself, we should lie 
allowed to take up the several items which composed it in succession, 
in the order in which they had been arranged, and to offer them for 
admission or rejection, accordingly as the judgment or sense of duty 
of the head of the Department, or the proper officer designated for 
the purpose, might determine: not expecting that a claim for any ex- 
pense would be allowed, unless it were shown, that the occasion called 
for its being incurred — that the service was both effectively and eco- 
nomically rendered, and that it has been fully and honorably paid for 
by the slate. 



6 [81] 

This course we regret extremely to find is not acceptable to the 
executive, if we were correctly impressed by the conversations which 
we had the honor to hold with you, the result of which, we understand 
to be, that the expenses not having been incurred under the authority 
of the United States, and the governor of Massachusetts having omit- 
ted to place the militia of the state under the officers of the general 
government, no account of this kind could be received for examina- 
tion at the Department, without an antecedent recognition by the 
President of the United States of the several cases under which the 
expense aiose. 

We cannot but lament this course being now taken, because we 
do not learn that it has been asked in any other instance to be pursu- 
ed so much in detail, as we now presume it to be required, in refer- 
ence to the claim of Massachusetts; because it will unavoidably entail a 
ronsiderable delay in classing anew the various expenses of the same 
f odies of militia, as they were at different times tailed into service, 
under separate heads or occasions; and may require a minuteness of 
evidence in support of the urgency of their being emploved, which 
The notoriety of the occasions at the time they occurred, and the line 
<>t conduct understood to be adopted towards other claims, was not 
upposed to require; and which evidence is not, even now in all its 
j'arts, probably in existence as a matter of record, and must therefore, 
io many instances, still remain to be collected in an official or authen- 
tic* shape, if this rigor in point of form should be adhered to. 

It is undoubtedly true, and neither a wish is felt, nor a direction 
been received to conceal the fact, that a difference of opinion has un- 
1 jitunately existed between the general government of the United 
States and the government of Massachusetts, respecting the consti 
rational powers in the former in relation to the control of the militia 
of the several states in the Union; and it is greatly to be deprecated 
that a difference in the construction of constitutional powers should 
ever excite other sentiments than those of a reciprocal respect, and a 
mutual disposition, after dispassionate consideration, to amend what 
may be defective, and to provide a remedy for the evils of the future, 
from the inconveniencies of the past; and, more especially should 
:his be the case in a government founded on the choice of enlighten- 
ed ireemen, to secure the enjoyment of rational liberty to themselves 
and their posterity — and the chief preservation of the purity and 
consequent duration of which must spring from the jealous vigilance 
with which all questionable expansions of power ought to be viewed, 
either on the part of the general government, or that of the states — 
and which disposition, therefore, instead of meeting the frowns, 
Mould appear to be entitled to the support and encouragement of eve- 
ry friend of the present form of government, and who would wish to 
maintain and transmit it, resting on its existing foundations, pure 
and unimpaired to distant generations. And, in a more particular 
manner, should this disposition of mutual respect and deference for 
conflicting opinions prevail, where the event has happily proved the 



[81] 7 

evils apprehended to flow from them to be those of imagination, ra- 
ther than of reality, and when the present prosperous circumstances 
of the country admit the people of the United States, the legitimate 
fountain of all power, peaceably to adopt that corrective which their 
ardent desire to secure and preserve their own rights, and those of the 
general and state governments, as denned by their respective consti- 
tution, will undoubtedly induce them to apply, should they consider 
the occasion as requiring it. 

The point in discussion, that of the constitutional control of the 
militia, and the exient to which it has been given to the general go- 
vernment, or is retained by the states respectively, has, from the first 
adoption of the federal constitution, been perhaps a question more 
doubtful and interesting in its nature, and has given rise to a greater 
liversity of opinion among the rnosteminent statesmen of the coun- 
try, and probably allows of a more honest difference of sentiment, thai* 
, an be brought into controversy under any other provision ol that 
constitution. 

Without meaning to sustain or scarcely to enter into the argu- 
ment, it is on the one hand conceded, that a denial of the construction 
given by the general government, would lessen the powers, and under 
erlain circumstances, materially impair the strength of the nation, 
while on the other, the admission to the fullest extent, of the doctrines, 
that the executive of the Union is to be the only judge ol the emer- 
gencies, under which the militia is to be brought into ihe service of 
the United States, at the time, and in the manner which it might think 
' xpedient; and that when so brought into service, the militia can. by 
the junction of a large number of their men, to a mere skeleton <.t 
tegular troops, be in fact officered by the United Slates, and that the 
xecutives of the several states, contrary to their own belief in the 
xistence of such emergencies, would be bound to bow before thistn* 
»unat, erected in the breast of a single individual, and to yield lmpli- 
. it Obedience to such opinion, must, alter the surrender of the several 
states of the principal sources of tin ir revenue, place them entirely 
t. the mercy or disposition of any future tenant of power; strip the 
idiyidual states of their physical as well as fiscal force, and you would 
scarcely leave them in possession of even the remnant of that sov- 
cignty and self-dependence which some of them undoubtedly sup- 
nosed they had retained; but it is repealed, it is not intended to d 
i uss this question, further than to prove, that with the mor.r correct 
views, different sentiments may honesllv and intelligibly exist, with 
regard to it; and that at any rate, the opinion adopted for the time by 
Massachusetts, was one fairly and deliberately formed by the gover- 
nor of alargt and respectable state, himself a statesman of forty year./ 
experience in the highest orlices in the country, and with the advice 
of his council; was corroborated by a judicial tribunal commanding 
the highest respect where known, and who are, by the constitution oi 
the state, bound to give their opinion " upon important questions c; 
y,"and '.' . : run ' to -he executive, was an cpinior. 



i 



3 [81] 

confirmed by the legislature, and sanctioned by the people by their 
reiterated support and election to office of the same public agents who 
adopted and avowed it; an opinion, therefore, entitled to great respect 
under all circumstances, and meriting every consideration which the 
most deliberate judgment could give to it, and perhaps requiring the 
settlement of a point so interesting in itsell, and so open to contro- 
versy, in the mode pointed out by the constitution, by an amendment 
explanatory of its powers, as applied to the rights of the general gov- 
ernment, and the states, in the employment of the militia, in the 
cases contemplated by the constitution. 

This course has already been recommended by the executive of 
a highly respectable state, (South Carolina.) not interested in the im- 
mediate question, to be adopted by its legislature, and seems to be 
that best founded in reason and expediency, and the one which might 
be attended with the happiest effects hereafter, in preventing miscon- 
structions or collisions of opinion, when they might become injurious 
to the public safety, if the subject were left in its present unsettled 
state. At anv rate, in a government yet in its infancy; in a govern- 
ment of experiment, which had never before tested or attempted to 
exercise its powers in a foreign war, and under a state of public sen- 
timent unprecedented in former times, it cannot be wished or expect* 
ed by anv pari of the community, that a difference of opinion rela- 
tive to the extent of constitutional powers, sanctioned as was that 
formed bv the state of Massachusetts, whether correct or erroneous 
in itself, can be suffered, after the services have been rendered, and 
the protection wanted in a great measure obtained, to remain as a 
lasting source of irritation, or to operate as a pecuniary mulct upon a 
brave and free people, who fust reared the standard that ultimately, 
by the common efforts of the nation, waved triumphantly over the es- 
tablished independence of the country, and who in that war, as well 
«is in the last, furnished their full propurtion of those who filled its 
armies and fought its battles. 

Still less, if possible, can it for a moment be believed, that a 
claim thus founded on a necessary and unavoidable dcience for the 
general safety against a common enemy, and not amounting in the 
whole t" one third of the sum which is contributed towards the reve- 
nues of the United States in a single year by a single port of the state 
that advanced it, can be retained as a lure for political subserviency, 
or its liquidation be withheld for the advancement of party purposes; 
a doctrine too discreditable to receive a moment's confidence, and 
v. quiring from the in dersigned an apology for its introduction, only 
' > Be derived from the public avowal and recommendation that has 
:i made of it, and tile expression of their perfect conviction, it 
will meet, both from the high officers of government, and from the 
people of the On i ted Statt s. the reprobation it deserves. 

We cannot, therefore, bu I feel confident thai the rightful and con- 
stitutional remedy before noticed, if it should appear, in the good 
judgment ol Congi • 'dfut, will I i orted to, and that the 



[81] 9 

claim of the state of Massachusetts will be admitted and repaid by 
the general government. Under the influence of these impressions^ 
we beg leave to state, as the origin of this claim, and as matter of no- 
toriety, that at the commencement of the war, the regular troops, 
perhaps not exceeding, at the time, a man to a mile of the exposed 
seacoast of Massachusetts, were, at a very early period, withdrawn 
to the northern frontier; that after the first year of the war, the mari- 
time border of the state was frequently threatened by the enemy; 
that a part of it was actually invaded, and a very commanding naval 
and militarv position in it, unassailable when once fortified and pos- 
sessed, without a superior naval force, except with great and nearly 
inevitable destruction, was secured and retained by the enemy; thus 
cutting off and keeping, in some degree, under his control, a large di- 
vision of the state, depriving it of the power of military co-operation, 
or of a safe and easy intercourse with the capital or the government; 
that the harbors along the coast were frequently annoyed, expeditions 
for further conquest menaced, and preparations made for effecting if: 
that several ports in the state were entered, the vessels in them, in 
some instances, burnt: that small defenceless towns were laid under 
contribution: that predatory incursions and alarms constantly prevail- 
ed: and that the security and protection of the inhabitants of the state 
from further aggression and insult, were derived from the services of 
the militia, in the way in which they were rendered, and in which, 
from various circumNtances, there is reason to believe, the defence of 
the state, by the militia, could alone have been made effectual. 

The circumstances relative to the calls for the service of the 
militia having been communicated to Congress by the Department, 
and for the greater part printed, we will not tresspass upon your time 
further, in relation to them, than to remark, that the first call was 
made in consequence of the letter of the honorable William Eustis, 
written prior to the declaration of war; and when that event still re- 
mained suspended in a very doubtful scale, and that none of the con- 
stitutional emergencies did, at the time, exist, or were expected by 
the government of Massachusetts speedily to occur, nor did they oc- 
cur, to any extent of importance, until two years after the request of 
general Dearborn, on the 22d of June, under the authority given him 
on the 12th of that month. But shortly after the declaration of war, 
to wit, on the 3d of July, 1812, the executive of Massachusetts issued 
the general order, (No. 1,) which accompanies the present commu- 
nication, for the purpose of placing the militia of the commonwealth 
in the most effective possible state, " exciting their love of country, 
and exhorting them to be obedient to the provisions and intentions 
of the laws in every respect, and to be ready, with alacrity and effect, 
to defend their constitutional rights and liberties," and apprising 
them, in case of invasion, or imminent danger thereof, they were to 
march without delay, and when in the actual service of the United 
States, to be placed under the orders of the President thereof. This 
order was sent, the same dav it was issued, to general Dearborn, and? 

2 



10 [81] 

shortly after this, a body of militia, consisting of three companies, 
was placed in the service of the United States, at Eastport, under the 
orders of general Boyd. 

The next request received by the governor was in July, 181i, 
y hen the probability of attack having increased, the general request- 
ed eleven hundred men might be ordered out for the defence of the 
more exposed parts of the seacoas. This order was complied with, 
the troops placed under the authority of the United Slates, and the 
service performed; part of the said troops, to the number requested 
by general Dearborn, having been stationed at Castine and Machias, 
prior to the capture of those places by the enemy. 

On the 5th September, 1814, general Dearborn again made a re- 
quisition on the governor of Massachusetts for a body of militia, 
when the general order (No. 2,) herewith presented was issued, on 
the 6th of the same month, and every measure taken to guard against 
the attacks of the enemy. A considerable body of the elite of the 
militia, from the interior, was ordered into immediate service, and 
marched and encamped on the seaboard, and the whole of the militia 
were enjoined to hold themselves in constant readiness, and were 
called upon * by every motive of iove of country, of honor, and 
sympathy for their fellow citizens, who might be suffering the perils 
of war, to maintain the most perfect state of preparation, and to move, 
when called to the scene of action, with the utmost celerity." But 
the difficulties which had arisen, and the complaints that had been 
made, from placing the mili#a in the immediate service of the Unit- 
ed States, under United Sta.es' officers, on former occasions had been 
such as to induce the belief it would be inexpedient, if not hazar- 
dous to repeat the order without having the power to enforce it. An 
arrangement was, however, subsequently made with general Dear- 
born, to place part of the militia in the forts of the United States, in 
the harbor of Boston, under the direction of his son, general II. S. 
Dearborn, and the very efficient body of troops before mentioned 
were stationed in the vicinity of the forts to reinforce and support 
them. 

A fourth requisition was made by general Dearborn to guard the 
prisoners at Pittsfield, but the same causes operated as in the other 
case, in addition to the belief that in the midst of a thickly settled 
population the danger of escape from the existing guard, or oi in- 
surrection, did not require a compliance with the call; the event veri- 
fied the soundness of the opinion. 

Tin all the calls for the militia which are known to h 

been made, and it is believed it can be shown that the omission to 
place the militia in the service of the United Si it< s was a matter qJ 
form rather than of fact; that the protectii i oi the country was never 
ir a moment abandoned, and that the militia were assembled and in 
readiness to ." ■ whenever emergencies appeared to require them; 
that the arrangements adopted were judicious, and in several in- 
tances predicated upon the wishes ot the officers oi the United 



[811 



11 



States, or of those who had the confidence of the general govern- 
ment, or who were at the time, or subsequently taken into its service, 
as will appear from the correspondence of generals Dearhorn, King, 
and If. S. Dearborn, and of commodore Bainbridge and captain Hull 
of the navv, presented in the papers marked 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 9, 10. 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15, and also from the letter of the honorable Wm. Jones, 
late Secretarv of the Navv. 

It can be demonstrated, also, that the services of the militia, so 
rendered, were both frugal and effective, as large bodies of troops 
were never unnecessarily called into service, nor retained in it longer 
than the occasion required; that the constant appearance and proba- 
ble knowledge of preparation and readiness to repel utack, prevented 
the advances or further depredation of the enemy; while the proprie- 
ty of this mode of defence has been admitted, as we conceive, not 
only bv the correspondence before referred to, and by the payments 
made under similar circumstances to other states, but also by the dic- 
tum of a former Secretary of War, promulgated at a period when, 
from the absence of all causes of irritation, the most dispassionate 
judgment could be formed, " that it is lawful for the governor of a 
state, when the state mav be invaded, or in imminent danger of in- 
vasion, to be the judge of the degree and duration of the danger, 
and to apportion the defence to the exigencies that presented," as 
appears from the report of general Dearborn, made to the House of 
Representatives of the United States. February 3d, 1803; and also 
from the opinion of general Knox, when in the same office, as ex- 
pressed in his letter of June 10th, 1793, to the governor of Georgia. 
And the utility and necessity of the said services of the militia, as 
they were rendered, is still more fully and strongly confirmed by the 
fact that, when so ordered into service, they received the recognition 
of general Dearborn, by the supplies of muskets and munitions of 
war he, in certain cases and to a considerable extent, furnished them 
with on loan, or otherwise, from the stores of the United States; and 
which had been requested of him expres-ly for the use of such 
bodies of militia ordered into seivice for the general defence of the 
seaboard. 

The foregoing embraces the chief outline of the claim we have 
been instructed to present, and we proceed now, in compliance with 
the suggestion of the Department, to state that so far as we have at 
present at command the means of judging, it may be classed under 
the following heads, to wit: 

1st. For the expenses of the militia who were called out by their 
respective officers,' in consequence of an attack, or threat, to lay small 
towns and defenceless places under contribution; or who rallied sud- 
denly against the depredatory incursions of the enemy's ships and 
barges, most of whom were in service only a few days at any one 
•time, having been discharged as soon as the danger ceased; and for 
toe pay and subsistence of small guards and detachments ordered 



12 



[81] 



out at the suggestion of general Dearborn for the defence of several 
small villages, whose ship, ping and property were much exposed. 

2d For the payment and supplies of the militia who were de- 
tached and ordered into the service of the United States, from the 
time thev were mustered in their several companies until they arriv- 
ed at their places of rendezvous, and for the rations and supplies 
furnished them after thev were received into the service of the Unit- 
ed States, none having been provided for them at the time. 

3d. For the pay and supplies of the militia marched for, and 
employed in the defence of the Penobscot frontier, after the country 
east of that river was taken possession of !>v the enemy* 

4th. For the expense of the militia who were detached, agreea- 
bly to the request of the superintendent i f the military district, and 
offered to be placed in the service of the I_'n ted States, organized 
according to law, which oiTcr was ;x c . ■' but a short time before 
the period for which thev were detached had expired; by reason of 
whjch, and the inability of the contractor on the station to furnish 
the supplies, they were regained in the s« rvi< e of the state. 

5th. For the expense of the militi i at Portland, which were call- 
ed into set vice at the request o! the commit! e i I 3 ifety of that town, 
at a time when the enemv's Beet, with troops on board, was lying on 
the coast; when great alarm existed in the town, and an attack was' 
momently expected; v, !u n the principal reliance for the defence of 
the town was on the militia; and when the sea r oast must have beep 
protected by them, or abandoned to the will of the enemy. 

uth. For troops employed foi the defence of 'important exposed 
places, some of which were attacked, and for the defence of which 
no troops wire requested to be placed in the service ol the Lniud 
States. 

7 h. For troops which al tl .., t ol the ci mmittee of safety 

of various town-, in time of alarm, were man hed in !• r the defence 
of those places, more than I ■ • ' offer* d to be 

placed in the service i f the Fi ited Stat the defence of such 

plaits, and who were immediately di- l on the cessation of 

danger. 

. For troops thai v called r the defence of Boston, 

beside - tl I in tl I : Unh- d St I who ¥ ere 

Stationed in its vicinity to r< . ons of thos< forts in ca i 

of attack, and to prevent tl nv ■ , - sion i f 

the heigl ts . dj ining, which commanded the forts, the town, and the 
IJnited Siatt - * navv \ ai 

tkh. For troops which, at th ■ request cveral naval com- 

manders at Boston a id P ■ smouth, and at the -<• m ol gi di ral 

Dea/hom, were called oi i i >r the proi 1 nited States 1 

74 gun ships builclii i places, and for thr defence of the shi 

of war of the United v- : ■ which were chased into port: part of the 
jtvideuce, in reference to be seen in the lettei I neiaj 



[81] 



13 



Dearborn, commodore Bainbridge, and captain Hull, and of adjutant 
general Brooks, who, in consequence of the directions of the execu- 
tive, promptly complied with the requests made, ordered some of the 
most effective and valuable corps in the state into service, and inform- 
ed the commodore that the governor was " fully disposed to do every- 
thing in his power to aid in defending the navy yard and the ships in 
the harbor which his authority by the constitution would admit." 

10th. For an allowance to the militia for arms and clothing, and 
the use of their horses when in service. 

11th. For the cost of procuring small arms, which were distri- 
buted among the militia, of mounting and transporting pieces of heavy 
ordnance, purchasing ammunition, tents, military stores, and equi- 
page. For barracks built and hired for the troops, and damage done 
to individuals in their property by erecting forts and occupying their 
buildings as barracks. 

12th. For the expenses of materials furnished for building plat- 
forms, magazines, furnaces, pickets, &c. in forts and batteries erected 
in conformity with the advice and suggestions of naval and military 
commanders of the United States. 

13th. For the pay and supplies of the militia who were employ- 
ed in fatigue duty, in repairing, extending, and strengthening the 
United States' forts in various places, and for the costs of the materials 
therefor; and for shot and other supplies of ammunition furnished 
to the commanders of those forts. 

li. For the pay and rations of the militia in the most exposed 
and important towns on the seaboard, who were called out two days 
in the week for discipline and exercise, agreeably to the wishes of the 
officers of the United States. 

15th. For the purchase of several large ships, and preparing 
them to be sunk in the main channel of Boston harbor, in concurrence 
with the opinion of naval and military commanders in the service of 
the United States, for the security of the navigation, towns, and navy 
yard; which vessels were sold after the peace, and the proceeds credit- 
ed to the United States. 

The preceding specification offers to view, sir, the principal heads 
of charges incurred and paid by the state, for the general defence and 
security during the late war, which at present occur to us. But we 
will omit, at this time, to burden you with voluminous docuuients in 
their support, as we understand the judgment, with regard to them, 
is to rest on principles and not on details; and to be dete: mined by 
the auhority given to the existing laws of the United States, the usage 
under them, and the opinion of the executive. The vouchei s in sup- 
port of the claim shall be promptly furnished, as soon as we can as- 
certain what mav be wanted and can procure them from Massachu- 
setts; but as we came unprepared for the exhibit, under the torm that 
has been prescribed, and are unwilling longer to delay this nore for 
the receipt of further documents, we ask leave to be considered as 
reserving to the state, or its agents, the right hereafter to extend, al 



U [81] 

ter or amend it, as a fuller development of the circumstances of the 
sevrral items of the account, or the evidence in their support may 

require. 

Under this illustration of the claim, we have now the honor to 
request vou would be pleased to inform us whether the expenses 
which Iv.ve arisen under the heads before enumerated, and which 
ha\ •- been naid bv the state, will be admitted to an examination at the 
War Department? And if the whole should not be so admitted, what 
part may be considered by the executive as entitled to payment, on 
the proof, hereafter to be produced, being satisfactorily established? 

We will onlv extend the present letter bv making known our 
readiness and desire to afford any further personal or other explana- 
tion on the subject to which it relates, whenever you may have the 
goodness to inform us it would be acceptable to you to receive it. 
And we also avail ourselves of the occasion to express the due sense 
we entertain of the urbanity and couitesy we have individually ex- 
perienced, both from the State and War Departments, in the inter- 
course we have had with them on the business committed to our 
charge. 

Requesting from you, sir, the favor of an answer as soon as the 
importance of the subject and your other various avocations will 
permit, 

We have the honor to be, 

With sentiments of great consideration, 

Your respectful and obedient servants, 

(Signed) JAMES LLOYD, 

WiM. H. SUMNER, 

Washington, February 3d, 1S17. 

The honorable Geo. Graham, 

Acting Sccretai" of War. 



[81] 15. 



(B.) 



(Copy.) Department of War, 

February Oth, 1817. 

GENTLEMEN, 

Your communication of the 3d instant, in relation to the claim 
of the state of Massachusetts for the reimbursement of expenses in- 
curred, and for supplies furnished for the service of its militia during 
the late war J has received the consideration due to it. 

As it appears that, with one exception, the militia on whose ac- 
count the expenses were incurred, were called out and kept in service 
by the state authorities, independently of the authority of the United 
States, and were withheld from the command of the officers ot the 
United States, placed by the President within the military district of 
which Massachusetts formed a part, with authority to call for and 
take militia into the service of the United States; the claim with 
which you have been charged is excluded from the recognition of the 
Executive authority of the United States by the principles explained 
in the answer of the Secretary of War to the communication of the 
governor of Massachusetts, of the 7ch of September, 1814, copies ot 
which are herewith enclosed. Those principles have been kept in 
view by the Executive of the United States, in all cases where ex- 
penses incurred by a state on account of militia services have been 
assumed. 

It follows from these observations, that no part of the claim pre- 
sented by you in behalf of the state of Massachusetts, can be assum- 
ed by the Executive, except for such expenses as were incurred " for 
the payment and supplies of the militia who were detached and or- 
dered into the service of the United States, from the time they were 
mustered in their several companies, until they arrived at their pla- 
ces of rendezvous, and for the rations and supplies furnished them 
after they were received into ihe service of the United States, none 
having been provided for them at the time." 

I have the honor to be, 

&c. Sec. &c. 

GEO. GRAHAM, 

$srs, Junes Lloyd, and 
Wm, ff. Sumner. 



[80 



17 



(C.) 



Committee Chamber, January 7th, 1815. 

SIR, 

The committee of the Senate on military affairs, having observed 
that differences exist between the authorities of the United States 
and of some of the individual states, respecting the relative com- 
mand of the officers of the regular army and of the militia, when 
called to act together in certain cases, has instructed me to ask for 
such information upon that subject as may be in the possession of your 
Department; and to inquire whether, in your judgment, some legis- 
lative provision might not be adopted, which would tend to heal such 
differences, to prevent the recurrence of others from the same cause, 
and to facilitate the operations of your Department in that respect. 

Be pleased, sir, to accept the assurances of my high considera- 
tion, &c. 

(Signed) WM. B. GILES, Chairman. 

Bon. James Monroe, 

Secretary for the Department of State. 



3 



58 [81] 



Department of JFar y February tlfA, 18i£ 
SIR, 

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 7th ult. 6tal 
ing that the military committee of the Senate had observed that dif- 
ficulties had arisen between the authoritien of the United States and 
some of the individual states, respecting the relative command of the 
officers of the regular army and of the militia, when called to act to- 
gether, and were desirous of such information on the subject as thin 
Department might possess, and of its opinion, whether some legisla- 
tive provisions micdn not be adopted which would tend to heal such 
differences, to prevent the recurrence of the like for the same causes, 
and to facilitate the operations of the Department in other respects? 

My late indisposition will, I trust, explain satisfactorily to the 
committee the cause of the delay of my answer, which 1 have much 
regretted. 

In complying with the request of the committee, it has appeared 
to me adviseable to communicate all the documents in this Depart 
ment relating to the objects of its inquiry. By a detailed view of the 
several measures which have been adopted by the President, since the 
war, for the defence of the country, in discharge of the duties im- 
posed on him by the constitution and laws of the United States, of 
the objections to those measures by the executives of some of the 
.states, and of the correspondence between this Department, and the 
military authorities acting under it, with the executives of such states. 
the committee will see the grounds of the differences which have at- 
tracted attention, and be enabled to judge how far any legislative in- 
terposition may be useful or proper. 

r lhe paper A, contains a copy of the letters of the Secretary of 
War to the governors of several states, detailing their respective 
quotas of militia under the acts of Congress. 

11, is a copy of a report of the Secretary of War to the military 
commhtees of the Senate and House of Representatives, bearing 
date on the 2ist day of December, 1812, communicating a division 
of the United States into military districts, then contemplated by the 
Department of War, with the reasons for it; which division, with 
certain modifications, was afterwards adopted. This report treats on 
some subjects not immediately within the scope of the call of th-: 
committee, yet treating in all its parts on the important subject of de 
fence, and thereby intimately connected with the object of the call, I 
have thought that a view of the whole paper, at this time, would no*. 
be unacceptable. 

(', is a copy of the answers of the governors of several of the 
states to the Department o*. War, on the requisitions made for pavts 



[81] 



19 



of their quotas of militia under the several acts of Congress, and of 
the correspondence which passed between them and the Department 
of War, and the commanders of the military districts acting under it, 
Within which those states were. 

D, is a copy of the correspondence between the governor of 
New Jersey and the Department of War, relating to the appointment 
of the governor of New York to the command of the military district, 
No. 3; a copy of this correspondence is presented to communicate 
to the committee every circumstance that has occurred relating to the 
command of the militia in the service of the United States. 

It appears by these documents that the governors of Massachu- 
setts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, have objected to the rcquisi. 
t ions made on their several states lor parts of their respective quotas 
of militia, on the following grounds: 1st. That the President has no 
power to make requisition for any portion of militia, for either of the 
purposes specified by the constitution, unless the executive of the 
state, on whose militia such call is made, admits that the case alleged 
exists, and approves the call, id That when the militia of a state 
should be called into the service of the United States, no officer of 
the regular army has a right to command, or oiher person, not an offi- 
cer of the militia, except the Piesident of the United States in per- 
son. These being the only difficulties which have arisen between the 
Executive of the United States and the executives of any of the in- 
dividual states, relative to the command of the militia, known to this 
Department, are, it is presumed, those respecting which the commit- 
tee has asked information. 

By these documents it is also shown that certain portions of the 
militia were called out bv the executives of these states, and a part 
of them put into the service of the United States: these doctrines 
were, nevertheless,, adhered to. I do not go into a detail on these 
points, deeming it unnecessary, as all the facts will be found in the 
documents. 

Respecting as I do, and always have done, the rights of the indi- 
vidual states, and believing that the preservation of those rights in 
their lull extent, according to a just construction of the principles of 
our constitution, is necessary to the existence of our Union, and of 
free government in these states, I take a deep interest in every ques- 
tion which involves such high considerations. 1 have no hesitation, 
however, in declaring it as my opinion, that the construction given to 
the constitution by the executives of these states is repugnant to its 
principles, and of dangerous tendency. 

By the constitution," Congress has power to provide for calling 
forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrec* 
tions, and repel invasions; to provide for organizing, arming, and dis- 
ciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be 
employed in the service of the United States; reserving to the states, 
respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of 



20 [81j 

training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Con« 
gress. 

The President is likewise made commander in chief of the army 
and nav\ of the United States, and of the militia of the several 
slates, when called into the actual service of the United States. 

The power which is thus given to Congress by the people of the 
United States, to provide for calling forth the militia for purposes 
specified in the constitution, is unconditional. It is a complete power, 
vested in the national government, extending to all these purposes; if 
it was dependent on the assent of the executives of the individual 
states it might be frustrated. The character of the government would 
undergo an entire and radical change; the state executives might de- 
ny that the case had occurred which justified the call, and withhold 
the militia from the service of the general government. 

It was obviously the intention of the framers of the constitution 
that these powers, vested in the general government, should be inde- 
pendent of the states' authorities, and adequate to the ends proposed. 
Terms more comprehensive than those which have been used, can- 
not welt be conceived. Congress shall haw power to provide for call- 
ing forth the militia fro execute the laws of the Union. What laws? 
AU laws which mav be constitutionally made. Whatever laws are 
adopted for that purpose, within the just scope of that power, which 
du not violate the restraints provided in favor of the great fundament- 
al principles of liberty, are constitutional, and ought to be obeyed. 
The) have a right to provide for calling forth the militia to suppress 
insurrections. This right is also unqualified' It extends to every 
case ol insurrection against the legitimate authority of the United 
States. It may be said that the government may abuse its authority, 
and force the people into an insurrection in defence of their rights. I 
do not think that this is a, probable danger under our system; or that 
it is the mode of redress, even if such abuse should be practised, 
which a free people, jealous of their rights, ought to resort to. The 
right which they have to change their representatives in the legisla- 
tive and executive branches of the government at short intervals, and 
thereby the whole system of measures, if tht-v should think proper, 
is an ample security against the abuse, and a remedy for it if it should 
ever occur. Congress have also a right to provide for calling forth 
the militia to repel invasions. This right, by lair construction, is, in 
my judgmi at, an exemplification of the power over the militia, to 
enable the government to prosecute the war with effect, and not tho 
limitation ot it, by strict construction, to the special case of a descent 
of the enemy On any particular part of our" territory. War exists, 
th< enemy is powerful, his pic pa rations are extensive, we may expect 
his attacks in many quarters. Shall we remain inactive spectators of 
the dangers, -which surround us, without making the arrangements 
sugg( 3 c ii by an ordinary instinctive foresight, for our defence? A 
regular army, in suliicient extent, may not exist. The militia is the 



[•81] 



21 



principal resource. Is it possible that a free people would thus in- 
tentionally trammel a government which they had created for the pur. 
pose of sustaining them in their just rank, and in the enjoyment of 
all their rights as a nation, against the encroachments of other pow- 
ers, more especially after they had experienced that reliance could 
not be placed on the states individually, and that without a general 
government thus endowed, their best interests would be sacrificed, 
and even their independence insecure? A necessary consequence of 
so complete and absolute a restraint on the power of the general gov- 
ernment over the militia, would be to force the United States to re- 
sort to standing armies for all national purposes. A policy so fraught 
with mischief, and so absurd, ought not to be imputed to a (ret peo- 
ple in this enlightened age. It ought not, more especially, to be im- 
puted to the good people of these states. Such a construction of the 
constitution is, in my opinion, repugnant to their highest interests, to 
the unequivocal intention of its framers, and to the just and obvious 
import of the instrument itself. 

The construction given to the constitution by the executive i,s 
sanctioned (n legislative authority, by the practice of the government, 
and bv the assent and acquiescence of all the states, since the adoption 
of the constitution to the period of the late unhappy differences, res- 
pecting which the committee has desired to be informed. Bv the hiw 
of 1795, the President is authorized to call forth the militia for the 
purposes mentioned in the constitution, by a direct application to the 
militia officers, without any communication with, or reference to, the 
executives of the individual states; and penalties are prescribed for 
carrving the law into effect, should resort to them be necessary. It 
merits attention, in regard to the question under consideration, that 
the power given to the President to call forth the militia, is not made 
dependent by this law, on the fact of an invasion having actually oc- 
curred, but takes effect in case of imminent danger ot it. In the 
year 1795, the President of the United States, on the certificate of a 
judge of the supreme court, that an insurrection existed in the western 
parts of Pennsylvania, called out the militia of several of the states, 
including the militia of Pennsylvania, to suppress it, which call was 
obeyed. In this instance the assent of the governor of Pennsylvania, 
to the existence of an insurrection, was not asked. General Wash- 
ington, who then held the office of chief magistrate, relied exclusive- 
ly on the powers of the general government for the purpose. The 
opinion of the same chief magistrate, of the power of the general 
government over the militia, was also made known by another distin- 
guished act of his administration. By a report of general Knox, the 
then Secretarv of War. to Congress, this doctrine is maintained to the 
utmost extent, and exemplifications of it insisted on, which prove, 
that from the nature of our population, the militia was the force which, 
in his judgment, ought principal!' to be relied on for all national pur- 
posesc 



22 [81] 

In the instances under consideration, powers are granted to Con- 
gress lor specified purposes in distinct terms. A right to carry pow- 
ers thus granted into effect, follows of course. The government to 
whom they are granted must judge of the means necessary for the 
purpose, subject to the checks provided by the system. It adopts a 
measure authorized, supervises its execution, and sees the impedi. 
ments to it. It has a right to amend the law to carry the power into 
effect. If any doubt existed on this point, in any case on general prin- 
ciples, and I see cause for \ione, it cannot in the present, a power hav- 
ing been explicitlv granted to Congress by the constitution, to pass all 
necessary and proper laws for carrying into execution the puweia 
which are vested in the general government. 

Equally unlounded, in my opinion, is the other objection of the 
executives of the states abovementioned, that when the militia of a 
state are called into the service of the United States, no officer of die 
regular army, or other person, not a militia officer, except the Presi- 
dent of the United Slates, in person, has a right to command them. 

Mhtn the militia are called into the service of the United States, 
all state authority over them ceasts. They constitute a part of the 
national force, for the time, as essentiallv as do the troops of the regu- 
lar army. Like the rtgular troops they are paid by the nation. Like 
them their operations are directed by the same government. The 
circumstance, that the officers of the militia are appointed by, and 
trained under, the authority of the state, individually, (which must, 
however, be done according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.) 
produces no effect on the great character of our political institutions, 
or on the character and duties of the m'iliiia, when called into the ser- 
vice of the United States. 

That the President alone has a right to command the militia in 
person, when called into the service of the United States, and that no 
officer of the regular army can take the command in his absence, is a 
construction for which I can see nothing in the constitution to afford 
the slightest pretext, is it inferred from the circumstance that he is 
appointed commander in chief of the militia when called into the ser- 
vice ol the I nited States. '1 he same clause appoints him command- 
er in chief of the land and naval forces of the United States. In 
construction of law, he is commander in chief, though not present. 
His presence is not contemplated in either case. Jrvjuallv necessary 
js it in the one as in the other. Vt hat has been the practice under 
the constitution, commenting with the fust chief magistrate, and pur- 
suing it, under bis successors, to the present time? lias any President 
ever commanded, in person, either the land and naval forces, or the 
militia? Is it not known that the power to do it is vested in him prin- 
cipally for the purpose of giving him the control over military and 
naval operations, being a n< cesBary attribute of the executive branch 
of the government? That though he might take the command of all 
the forces under ir, no Presid< tit has ever done it? That a provision 



[81] 



23 



for the actual command is an object of legislative regulation, and the 
selection of the person to whom committed, of executive discretion? 
Under the commander, all the officers of every species and corps, 
regular and militia, acting together, take rank with common consent 
and perfect harmony, according to an article of war, sanctioned by the 
constitution. By this article the officers of the regular army take 
rank of those of the militia of the same grade, without regard to the 
dates cf their commissions; and officers of any and every grade of 
the militia take rank of all officers of inferior grade of the regular 
army. >Vhen these troops serve together, they constitute but one 
national force. They are governed by the same articles of war. The 
details for detachment, guard, or any other service, are made from 
them equally. They are, in truth, blended together as much as are 
the troops of the regular army when acting by themselves only. 

The idea advanced by the honorable judges of Massachusetts, 
that where the regular troops and militia act together, and are com- 
manded by the President in person, who withdraws, there can be no 
chief commander, of right, of either species of force, over the whole, 
but that the regulars and militia, as implied, may even be considered 
as allied forces, is a consequence of the construction for which they 
contend. It pushes the doctrine of state rights further than I have 
ever known it to be carried in any other instance. It is only in the 
case of powers who are completely independent of each other, and 
who maintain armies and prosecute war against a common enemy, 
for objects equally distinct and independent, that this doctrine can 
apply. It does not apply to the case of one independent power, who 
takes into its service the troops of another, for then the command is 
always at the disposal of the power making war, and employing such 
troops, whether regular or militia. How much less does it apply to 
the case under consideration, where there is but one power and one 
government, and the troops, whether regular or militia, though dis- 
tinguished by shades of character, constitute but one people, and are, 
in fact, countrymen, friends and brethren! 

The President is in himself no bond of union in that respect, 
He holds his station as commander in chief of the land and naval 
forces, and of the militia, under a constitution which binds us to- 
gether as one people, for that and many other important purposes, 
liis absence would not dissolve the bond. It would revive discordant, 
latent claims, or become a signal for disorganization. 

The judicious selection of the chief commander, for any expe- 
dition or important station, is an object of high interest to the nation, 
Success often depends on it. The right to do this, appears to me, to 
have been explicitly vested in the President, by the authority given 
to Congress to provide for calling forth the militia, for organizing, 
arming, disciplining, and governing them, when employed in the ser- 
vice ol the United States, and by the powers vested in him as chief 
executive of the United States. The rights of that highly reapecu- 



24 [81] 

ble and virtuous body of our fellow citizens are, I am persuaded, 
completely secured, when the militia officers commanding corps are 
retained in their command — a major general over his division, a bri- 
gadier over his brigade, a colonel over his regiment, and the inferior 
officers in their respective stations. These rights are not injured or 
affected by the exercise of the right of the chief magistrate} aright 
incident to the executive power, equally applicable to every species of 
force, and of high importance to the public to appoint a commander 
over them of the regular army, when employed in the service of the 
United States, if he should deem it expedient. The rights of the 
militia officers, and those of the general government, are strictly 
compatible with each oiher. There is no collision between them. 
To displace militia officers for the employment of regulars, or to mul- 
tiply commands of a separate character, especially of small bodies, 
for that purpose, would be improper. In dividing the United -States 
into military districts, and placing a general of the regular army in 
command in each, with such portion of the regular force, artillery 
and infantrv, as could be spared from other service, it was the object 
of the President to afford the best protection to every part of the 
Union that circumstances would admit of, with the least burden which 
might he possible to the people. These commanders were specially 
charged with the defence of their respective districts. It was enjoin- 
ed on them to watch the movements of the enemy, to communicate 
to the government, and to execute its orders in summoning to the 
field, on menace of invasion, such portions of the quotas of the mili- 
tia of each state, within their respective districts, as had been provid- 
ed for by act of Congress, and detailed by this Department, as were 
thought necessary. 

When this arrangement was entered into, it will be observed that 
there were no menace of immediate invasion, and few militia in the 
held. It was intended as a measure of precaution, to guard against 
possible, but, as was hoped and presumed, distant dangers. The ex^ 
ecutive then had no alternative between that arrangement and any 
other. The militia officers of rank afforded none, they were at home, 
for the executive has no power, under existing laws, to call them in- 
to the field, without a command of men suited to their rank; and 
even when thus called forth, their term of service must expire with 
that of the men whom they command. These facts show that nothing 
was more remote from the intentions of the government than to dis- 
. gard the just claims of our fellow citizens of the militia. They 
..how, also, how difficult it is to provide, by any arrangement which 
ui be adopted, lor a general and permanent defence of our cities and 
seaboard, without employing officers who are always in service, in 

principal commands at least, for the purpose. 
It is admitted that by the increased pressure ot the war, in con- 
sequence of which much larger bodies of militia have been called in- 

l rvice, and with them many general officers of experience and 



[81] 25 

merit, these difficulties have proportionally diminished. Of these 
officers, several have been already advanced to distinguished com- 
mands with great satisfaction to their fellow-citizens, and advantage 
10 their country. The committee may be assured that opportunities 
of this kind, regarding the obligation of a just responsibility, will be 
seized by the Executive with pleasure. 

How far these differences may be healed, or the recurrence of the 
like in future be prevented by legislative provisions, the committee, 
on a full view of these documents, and on a due consideration of the 
whole subject, will be able to decide. It is proper, however, to re- 
mark, that the division of the country into military districts, so far as 
relates to that special object, requires no legislative sanction, z( indeed 
it admits of one. The definition of boundary was intended for the 
purpose of prescribing a limit to the civil duties, if they may be so 
called, rather than the military, of the commander of each district; 
rather to the period preceding an invasion, with a view to the neces- 
sary preparatory measures for repelling it, than after it should take 
place. An invasion by a large force would probably require the con- 
centration of all our troops along the seacoast, who might be brought 
to act in it; in such an event, all limitations of boundary to the seve- 
ral commanders would cease, the march of the enemy would regulate 
that of our armies, who would from every quarter be directed against 
;hem. 

I have the honor to be, &c. 

(Signed) JAS. MONROE. 



A. 



Copy of a letter from William Eustis, Secretary of War, to the gover- 
nors of states, dated War Department, April 5, 1812. 

I am instructed by the President of the United to call upon the 
executives of the different states to take effectual measures to or- 
ganize, arm, and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness to 
march at a moment's warning, their respective proportions of one 
hundred thousand militia, officers included, by virtue of an act of 
Congress, passed the 10th instant, entitled " An act to authorize a 
detachment from the militia of the United States." 

This, therefore, is to require your excellency to take effectual 
measures for having — *— — of the militia of • (being her 

4 



26 [81] 

quota,) detached and duly organized in companies, battalions, regi- 
ments, brigades, and divisions, within the shortest periods that cir- 
cumstances will permit, and as nearly as possible in the following pro- 
portions of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, viz: one twentieth part of 
artillery, one twentieth part of cavalry, and the residue infantry. 

There will, however, be no objection on the part of the Presi- 
dent of the United States, to the admission of a portion of riflemen, 
duly organized in the distinct corps, and not exceeding one tenth part 
of the whole quota of the states, respectively. Each corps should 
be properly armed and equipped for actual service. 

"When the detachment and organization shall have been effected, 
the respective corps will be exercised under the officers set over them, 
but will not remain embodied, or be considered as in actual service, 
until by subsequent orders they shall be directed to take the field. 

Your excellency will please to direct that correct muster-rolls 
and inspection returns be made of the several corps, and that copies 
thereof be transmitted to this Department as early as possible. 



Copy of a letter from William Eustls, esquire,' Secretary of War, to the 
governor of Massachusetts, dated War Department, June 12, 
1812. 

SIR, 

I am directed by the President to request your excellency to or- 
der into the service of the United States, on the requisition of major 
general Dearborn, such part of the quota of the militia of Massachu- 
setts, detached conformably to the act of 10th April, 1812, as he may 
deem necessary for the deience of the seacoast. 



E°P'J °f ° lettcr f rom WilHam Eustis, Secretary of War, to his excel- 
lency Caleb Scrcng, governor cf Massachusetts, dated July 3l*f, 
181 :\. 

sin, 

By information received from major general Dearborn, it appears 
that i detachment from the militia of Massachusetts, for the defence 
of th^ maritime frontier, required by him under the authority of the 
President, by virtue of the act of the 10th of April, 1112, have nor 
been m. <. to the several stations assigned ttvm. 



[81] 



27 



Inasmuch as longer delay may be followed with distress to a cer- 
tain portion of our fellow citizens, and with injurious consequences 
to our country, I am commanded by the President to inform your ex- 
cellency that this arrangement of the militia was preparatory to the 
march of the regular troops to the northern frontier. The exigencies 
of the service have required, and orders have accordingly been given 
to major general Dearborn, to move the regular troops to that fron- 
tier, leaving a sufficient number to man the guns in the garrisons on 
the seaboard. The execution of this order increases, as your excel- 
lency cannot fail to observe, the necessity of hastening the detached 
militia to their several posts, as assigned by general Dearborn; in 
which case they will, of course, be considered in the actual service 
and pay of the United States. 

The danger of invasion which existed at the time of issuing the 
order of the President, increases; and I am especially directed by the 
President to urge this consideration to your excellency, as requiring 
the necessary order to be given for the immediate march of the seve- 
ral detachments, specified by general Dearborn, to their respective 
posts. 

I have the honor to be, &c. &c. 



Circular letter from John Armstrong, Secretary of War, to the govern 
nors of the respective states, dated July 4-, 1814. 

SIR, 

The late pacification in Europe offers to the enemy a large dis- 
posable force, both naval and military* and with it the means of giving 
to the war here a character of new and increased activity and extent. 

Without knowing, with certainty, that such will be its application, 
and still less that any particular point or points will become objects of 
attack, the President has deemed it adviseable, as a measure of pre- 
caution, to strengthen ourselves on the line of the Atlantic, and (as 
the principal means of doing this will be found in the militia) to in- 
vite the executives of certain states to organize and hold in readU 
ness, for immediate service, a corps of ninety-three thousand five 
hundred men, under the laws of the ~3th of February, 1795, and 18th 
of April, 181 1. 

The enclosed detail will show your excellency what, under this 
requisition, will be the quota of — — -. As far as volun- 
teer uniform companies can be found, they will be preferred, 



28 [81] 

The expediency of regarding (as well in the designating of the 
wilitia, as of their places of rendezvous) the points, the importance 
or exposure of which will be most likely to attract the views of the 
enemy, need but be suggested. 

A report of the organization of your quota, when completed, 
and its place or places of rendezvous, will be acceptable. 

I have the honor to be, &c. 



c. 

(Copy.) 

Boston, August 5, 1811'. 
SIR, 

I received your letter of the 21st July, when at Northampton, 
and the next day came to Boston. The people of this state appear 
to be under no apprehension of an invasion. Several towns, indeed, 
on the seacoast, soon after the declaration of war, applied to the go- 
vernor and council for arms and ammunition, similar to the articles of 
that kind which had been delivered to them by the state in the course 
of the last war; and in some instances they were supplied according- 
ly. But they expressed no desire that any part of the militia should 
be caHed out for their defence; and in some cases we were assured 
such a measure would be disagreeable to them. 

You observe in your last letter, that the danger of invasion, which 
existed at the time of issuing the orders of the President, increases. 
It would be difficult to infer from this expression, that in your opinion 
that danger is now very considerable, as the President's order must 
have been issued before war was declared, your former letter being 
dated the 12th of June, and general Dearborn's, who was then in Bos- 
ton, on the 22d of that month; besides, it can hardly be supposed 
that it this state had been in great danger of invasion, the troops 
would have been called from hence to carry on offensive operations in 
a distant province; however, as it was understood that the governor 
ot Nova Scotia had. by proclamations, forbid any incursions or de- 
>rt dati'ms upon our territories, and as an opinion generally prevailed, 
that the governor had no authority to call the militia into actual ser- 
vice, unless one of the exigencies contemplated by the constitution 
<-xists, 1 thought it expedient to call the council together, and having 
laid before them your letter, and thobe 1 had received from general 
Dearborn, I requested their advise or. the subject of them. 



[81] 



29 



The council advised, «' that they were unable, from a view of th^ 
Constitution of the United States, and the letters aforesaid, to per 
ceive that any exigency exists which can render it adviseable to com- 
ply with the said requisition; but, as upon important questions of law, 
and upon solemn occasions, the governor and council have authority 
to require the opinion of the justices of the supreme judicial court, 
it is adviseable to request the opinion of the supreme court upon ttv- 
following questions, viz: 

14 1st. Whether the commanders in chief of the militia of the 
several states have a right to determine whether any of the exigen- 
cies contemplated by the constitution of the United States exist, so as 
to require them to place the militia, or any part of it, in the service of 
the United States, at the request of the President, to be commanded 
by him pursuant to acts of Congress?" 

14 2d. Whether, when either of the exigencies exist, authorizing 
the employing the militia in the service of the United States, the mi- 
litia thus employed, can be lawfully commanded by any officer but of 
the militia, except by the President of the United States?" 

I enclose a copy of the answers given by the judges to these 
questions. 

Since the council were called, a person deputed by the towns of 
Eastport and Robinston, on our eastern boundary, at Passamaquoddy, 
applied to me, representing that they had no apprehensions oi an in- 
vasion by an authorized British force; but that there were many law- 
less people on the borders, from whom they were in danger of preda- 
tory incursions; and requesting that they might be furnished with 
some arms and ammunition, and that three companies of militia might 
be called out for their protection. The council advised that they 
should be supplied with such arms and ammunition as were necessary 
for their present defence, which has been ordered. They also ad- 
vised me to call into the service of the United States, three compa- 
nies of the detached militia, for the purpose abovementioned. I have 
this day issued an order for calling out three companies of the de- 
tached militia, to be marched forthwith to Passamaquoddy, and to be 
commanded by a major; two of the companies will be stationed ac 
Eastport, and one company at Robinston, until the President shall 
otherwise direct. 

I have no intention officially to interfere in the measures of th^ 
general government, but if the President was fully acquainted with 
the situation of this state, I think he would have no wish to call our 
militia into service in the manner proposed by general Dearborn. 

It is well known that the enemy will find it difficult to spare troops 
sufficient for the defence of their own territory, and predatory incur- 
sions are not likely to take place in this state, lor at every point, except 
Passamaquoddy, which can present an object to those incursions, the 
people are too numerous to be attacked by such parties a^ generally 
engage in expeditions oi that kind. 



30 [81j 

General Dearborn proposed that the detached militia should be 
stationed at only a few of the ports and places on the east; from the 
rest a part of their militia were to be called away; this ciicumstance 
would increase their clanger: it would invite the aggressions of the 
enemy, and diminish their power of resistance. 

The whole coast of Cape Cod is exposed as much as any part of 
the state to depredations; part of the militia must, according to this 
detailing order, be marched from their homes, and yet no place in 
the old colony of Plymouth is assigned to be the rendezvous of any of 
the detached militia. Every harbor or port within the state has a com- 
pact settlement, and generally the country around the harbor is popu- 
lous. The places contemplated in general Dearborn's specifications, 
as the rendezvous of the detached militia, excepting in one or two 
instances, contain more of the militia than the portion of the militia 
assigned to them. The militia are well organized, and would, un- 
doubtedly, prefer to defend their firesides, in company with their 
friend-, under their own officers, rather than be marched to some 
distant place, while strangers might be introduced to take their places 
at home. 

In Boston the militia is well disciplined, and could be mustered 
in an hour, upon any signal of an approaching enemy; and in six hours 
the neighboring towns would pour in a greater force than an invading 
enemy will bring against it. 

The same remark applies to Salem, Marblehead, and Xewbury- 
port, places whose harbors render an invasion next to impossible. In 
all of them there are, in addition to the common militia, independent 
corps of infantry and artillery, well disciplined and equipped, and 
ready, both in disposition and means, to repair to any place where 
invasion may be threatened, and able to repel it, except it should be 
made by a fleet oi heavy ships, against which nothing, perhaps, would 
prove anv defence until the enemy should land, when the entire mili- 
tia would be prepared to meet them. 

Kenm bur.k is unassailable by any thing but boats, which the nu- 
merous armed population is competent to resist. Portland has a mi- 
litia and independent corps, sufficiently numerous for its defence; and 
the same is the case with Wisxasset and Castine. 

Against predatory incursions, the militia of each place would be 
able to defend their property, and in a very short time they would be 
aided, i! necessary, by the militia of the surrounding country. In 
case of a mere serious invasion, whole brigades or divisions could be 
collected seasonably for defence. Indeed, considering the state of 
the militia in this commonwealth, I think there can be no doubt, that 
detaching a part of it, and distributing it into small portions, will tend 
to impair the d< fen ive power. 

I have thus freely expressed to you my own sentiments, and so 

! have heard, they are the sentiments of the best informed men. 

1 am fully disposed lo afford all the aid to the measures of the na- 

• rnment which the constitution requires of me, but, I per- 



[31] 



31 



sume it will >ot be expected, or desired, that I shall fail in the duty 
which I,o we to the people .of this state, who have confided their in« 
terests to my care. 

I am, sir, with respect, 

Your most obedient and humble servant, 
(Signed) CALEB STRONG 

The honorable William Eustk, 
Secretary of War. 



To his excellency the governor, and the honorable the council of the 
commonwealth of Massachusetts: The undersigned, justices of 
the supreme judicial court, have considered the questions proposed 
by your excellency and honors for their opinion. 

By the constitution of this state, the authority of commanding 
the militia of the commonwealth is vested exclusively in the gover- 
nor, who has all the power incident to the office of commander-in- 
chief, and is to exercise them personally, or by subordinate officers 
under his command, agreeably to the rules and regulations of the 
constitution and the laws of the land. 

While the governor of the commonwealth remained in the ex- 
ercise of these powers, the federal constitution was ratified; by which 
was vested in the Congress a power to provide for calling forth the 
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and 
repel invasions, and to provide for governing such part of them as 
may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the 
states, respectively, the appointment of the officers. 

The federal constitution further provides, that the President 
shall be commander in chief of the army of the United States, and 
of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service 
of the United States. 

On the construction of the federal and state constitutions must 
depend the answers to the several questions proposed. As the militia 
of the several states may be employed in the service of the United 
States for the three specific purposes of executing the laws ot the 
Union, of suppressing insurrections, and of repelling invasions, the 
opinion of the judges is requested, whether the commanders in chief 
of the militia of the several states have a right to determine whether 
any of the exigencies aforesaid exist, so as to require them to place 
the militia, or anv part of it. in the service of the United States, at 



^2 [81] 

the request ot the President, to be commanded by him pursuant to 
acts of Congress? 

It is the opinion of the undersigned, that this right is vested in 
the commanders in chief ot the militia of the several states. 

The federal constitution provides, that whenever either of those 
exigencies exist, the militia may be employed pursuant to some act 
of Congress, in the service of the United States; but no power is giv- 
rn either te the President or to Congress to determine that either of 
the said exigencies do in fact exist. As this power is not delegated 
to the United States by the federal constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the states, it is reserved to the states respectiveh ; and from the 
nature of the power, it must be exercised by those with whom the 
states have respectively entrusted the chief command of the militia. 

It is the duty of these commanders to execute this important 
trust, agreeably to the laws of their several states, respectively, with- 
out reference to the laws or officers of the United States, in all cases 
except those specially provided in the federal constitution. They 
must, therefore, determine whether either of the special cases exist, 
obliging them to relinquish the execution of this trust, and to render 
themselves and the militia subject to the command of the President. 
A different construction, giving to Congress the right to determine 
when these special cases exist, authorizing them to call forth the 
whole of the militia, and taking them from the commanders in chief 
of the several states, and subjecting them to the command of the 
President, would place all the militia, in effect, at the will of Con- 
gress, and produce a military consolidation of the states, without any 
constitutional remedy against the intentions of the people when rati- 
fying the constitution. Indeed, since passing the act of Congress of 
February 23th, 1795, chapter 101, vesting in the President the power 
of calling forth the militia when the exigencies mentioned in the con- 
stitution shall exist, if the President has the power of determining 
when those exigencies exist, the militia in the several states is in ef- 
fect at his command, and subject to his control. 

Kg inconvenience can reasonably be presumed to result from the 
construction which vests in the commanders in chief of the militia, in 
tiie several states, the right of determining when the exigencies exist 
obliging them to place the militia in the service of the United States. 
These exigencies are of such a nature, that the existence of them 
can be ea ily ascertained by, or made known to, the commanders in 
thief of the militia; and when ascertained, the public interest will 
produce prompt obedii nee to the a';ts of Congress. 

Another question proposed to the consideration of the judges, 
is, whether, when either o\' the exigencies exist authorizing the em- 
ploying of the militia in the service of the United States, the militia 
thus employed can be 1 iwfully commanded by any officer but cf the 
militia, except by the President of the United Stat 



[81] 



SS 



The federal constitution declares, that the President shall be 
commander in chief of the army of the United Suites. He may un- 
doubtedly exercise this command by officers of the army of the Unit- 
ed States, by him commissioned, according to law 4 . The President 
is also declared to be the commander in chitf of the militia of the 
several states> when called into the actual service of the United States. 
The officers of the militia are to be appointed bv the states and the 
President may exercise' his command of the militia bv officers of the 
militia, duly appointed; bat we know of no constitutional provision 
authorizing any officer of the army of the United States to cammand 
the militia, or authorizing any officer of the militia to command the 
army of the United States. The Congress may provide laws for the 
government of the militia when in actual sdrvice; but to extend this 
power to the placing them under the command of an officer not ol the 
militia, except the President, would render nugatory the provision, 
that the militia are to have officers appointed by the states. 

The union of the militia in the actual service of the United 
States, with troops of the United States, so far as to form one army, 
seems to be a case not provided for or contemplated in the constitu- 
tion. It is, therefore, not within our department to determine on 
whom the command would devolve, on such an emergency, in the 
absence of the President. Whether one officer, either of the militia 
or of the army of the United States, to be settled according to mili- 
tary rank, should command the whole; whether the corps must be 
commanded by their respective officers, acting in concert as allied 
powers, or what other expedient should be adopted, are questions to 
be answered by others. 

The undersigned regret that the distance of the other justices 
of the supreme judicial court, renders it impracticable to obtain their 
fiions seasonably upon the questions submitted. 

'Signed) THEOPH1LUS PARSONS, 

SAMUEL SEWALL, 
ISAAC PARKER. 



Extract of a letter from general Dearborn, to the Secretary of War 
dated, MzTitarij ti'utrict No. 1, Head Quarters, Boston, July ±iuh f 
1814. 

S^R, 

From the exposed and unprotected situation of the military posts 

in this harbor, and the seaboard of this state generally, and the threats 

• daily depredations of the enemy, I have concluded it my duty tc 

5 



34 [31] 

exercise the authority vested in me by the President of the United 
States, by requesting the governor to order out a detachment of ar- 
tillery and infantry. 

A copy of my letter to governor Strong, and of his answer, are 
•nclosed. 



Copy of a letter from general Dearborn to his excellency Caleb Strong, 
governor of the state of Massachusetts, dated Military District 
jYo. 1, Head Quarters, Boston, July 8, 181*. 

SIR, 

The existing state of alarm on the seaboard of this common- 
wealth, arising from the daily depredations committed by the enemv 
on our coast, renders it desirable to afford some additional protec- 
tion to the citizens generally on the seacoast, and especially to the 
principal towns and villages; and by virtue of authority derived from 
the President of the United States. I deem.it my duty, at this time, 
to request that your excellency will be pleased to give the necessary 
orders for having detached, as early as circumstances will permit, 
armed and equipped as required by law, one major of artillery, two 
captains, eight lieutenants, thirteen sergeants, eleven corporals, six 
musicians, and two hundred privates; and one lieutenant colonel of 
infantry, tw i majors, ten captains, thirty subalterns, one adjutant, one 
quartermaster, one paymaster, one sergeant major, one quartermaster 
sergeant, two principal musicians, fifty sergeants, fifty corporals, 
twenty musicians, and nine hundred privates, to remain in the service 
of the United States for the term of three months, unless sooner dis- 
charged by order of the President of the United States. As it will 
be necessary to have the artillery and infantrv placed at the different 
posts on the seaboard of this state, it would be desirable that, as far 
as practicable, they would be detached from the vicinity ol the res- 
pective posts. The intended distribution of the detachment will be 
communicated to the adjutant general of the state, previous to his 
issuing the necessarv orders. The proportion of officers, noncom- 
missioned officers, musicians, and privates, is in conformity with the 
present regulations of the Department of War, from which I am nc' 
i -thorized to admit of anv material deviation. 



[fill 



35 



Cepy of a letter from his excellency, Caleb Strongs governor of the 
state of Massachusetts, to ge?ieral Dearborn, dated Northampton, 
July 12,181*. 

SIR, 

This morning I received your letter of the 8th instant. As you 
propose to communicate to general Brooks your views, concerning 
the particular destination of the militia to be called out for the de- 
fence of the towns on the seacoast of this state, I have written to 
him on the subject. 

Your suggestion that the men should be detached, as far as may 
be, from the vicinity of the respective posts, I think is perfectly pro- 
per, and I have no doubt you will be able to make such arrangements 
with general Brooks as will be satisfactory. 



Extract of a letter from general Dearborn to the Secretary of fFar, 
dated Military District No. 1, Head Quarters, Boston, Septem- 
ber 5, 181*. 

SIR, 

Having received such information as is entitled to full credit, 
that the enemy, with a formidable naval and land force, has arrived in 
Penobscot bay, and taken possession of Castine, and presuming his 
force, after forming a place of arms at Castine, will, with such rein« 
forcements as he mav receive from Halifax, in addition to the naval 
force now in Boston bay, attempt the destruction of the public ships 
and other public and private property on the seaboord. I have deemed 
it necessary* to request the governor of this state and New Hamp- 
shire to order out, for the defence of Boston harbor, Portsmouth, 
Portland, and that part of the district of Maine between Kennebunk 
river and Penobscot, five thousand two hundred infantry, and five 
hundred and fifty artillery, for the term of three months, unless soon* 
rr discharged. 



36 [SI] 



/ xtrael of a tetter from U. Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated 
Head Quarters, District ^Xo. 1, Boston, October I?, 181 i. 

SIR, 

In obedience to the direction in your letter of the 27th ultimo, 
o v ttse 2d instant I made a formal requisition on governor Strong i<>r 
thre hundred mi ilia, to guard the prisoners at Vittsfield; and I en- 
closed to him a copy of your 1< tter, for the purpose of showing him 
the necessity ol his compliance. Having waited until yesterday morn- 
ing without an\ answer from his excellency, I directed one of my aids 
to call on the adjutant general ol the state to ascertain whether he had 
received any order for mal ing out the detachment for Pitts-field. Tho 
answer was. thru no direction had been received from the governor 
to make such detachment. 



Copy of a letter from his excellency, Caleb Wrong, governor of the 
state of Massachusetts, to the Secretary oj liar, doled Boi 
September 7, 1814. 

The troops of the United States. whi< h at different periods were 
stationed on the seacoast of this state, have been afterwards ordered 
to join the army on the western frontiers, so that very lew have re- 
mained in '.he state. We have therefore f< und it necessary, in the 
course of the last and , r sen! year, to call out small bodies of the 
militia as guards to the tow ns most < xposed. As the danger has in- 
creased, the number of detached militia has been augmented, and I 
have now issued the enclosed general order, lor the protection of 
JJoston, and the towns and property in its neighborhood, and shall 
imn; diateh issqe an order of a similar kind for the security of the 
district oi Maine. 

A fi w we :k <-'mre, agreeabl) to the request of general Dear- 
r-.n, 1 detached eleven hundred militia, for three months, for the 
defence ol oui - it, and placed tin m under his command, as sti- 

ptri intend" this military district; 1 at such objections and incon- 

yinlences l.v arisen from that measure, that it cannot now be re- 
peated. Th< mi it i c.dled < u i n tl s occasion will be placed under 
the immediati | ■•■ r> • i genera] ' — ■.'.•' a. 



[81] 



37 



I will thank vou, sir, to consult with the President, and inform 
me whether the expenses thus necessarily incurred for our protection, 
will be ultimately reimbursed to this state by the general government; 
and I shall be particularly obliged if you will favor me with an an- 
swer as soon as may be, as the legislature of the state will meet on 
the fifth of the next month. 



(Copy.) 

GENERAL ORDERS. 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Head Quarters, Boston, Septentr 

bcr 6, 1814. 

The war between the United States and GreatBritainhavinglately 
become more destructive, in consequence of violations of our territory, 
which continue to menace our cities and villages, the shipping in our 
harbors, and private property onshore, his excellency, the commander 
in chief, orders the whole of the mlilitia to hold themselves in readiness 
to march at a moment's warning, with arms, ammunition, aid ac- 
coutrements, as the laws of the United States, and of this state, re- 
quire. Every man must likewise be provided with a good knapsack 
and blanket. Captains of companies must realize it to be one of 
their most solemn and imperious duties, to see the law respecting 
arms and equipments efficaciously executed; but the commander in 
chief relies on the concurring aid of all the general and held officers 
in encourageing the company officers in the discharge of their duty. 
The major generals, and commanding officers of divisions will give the 
necessary orders for an immediate inspection of their several regi- 
ments, by companies. Every instance of deficiency of arms or equip- 
ments should be forthwith supplied by the delinquent individual, or 
by the town to which he may belong, agreeably to the requirements 
of the militia law. 

The officers commanding regiments, battalions, and companies 
of artillery, will pay special attention, at this interesting moment, to 
the state of their field pieces, their carriages and tumbrils; and see 
that every thing appertaining to them is in the most perfect order for 
marching, end for action, and particularly that suitable horses are al- 
ways engaged, and ready at any moment to be attached to their pieces, 
that they may be moved to any point required with celerity. All the 
companies of artillery now to be called into immediate service, be- 
sides the requisite supplies of fixed and other ammunition, will be 
furnished by the quartermaster general with prolonges and bricoles. 



33 [81] 

The legislature of this state, alwavs proud of its militia, has been 
particularly liberal in its artillery establishment; and the commander 
in chief promises himself that, emulating the brilliant example of 
Knox, and his heroic associates, in the artillery of the revolution, 
they will be i distinguished for their discipline as soldiers, and 

for their gallantr) i the field. 

Under possible events, the cavalry of the several divisions mav 
be in requisition. Every motive, therefore, of lo\e of country, of 
honor and sympathy for their fellow citizens, who may be suffering 
the perils of war. will prompt them to maintain the most perfect state 
of preparation, and 10 move, when called to the scene of action, with 
all the rapidity of which cavalry is susceptible. The general officers, 
and the fu Id officers of cavalry, as well as the companv officers, will 
direct their attention to the quality of the horses, and suffer no man 
to be mounted but upon a horse sound and fit for actual service. A 
few bad horses mav occa ion irretrievable disaster. 

The commander in chief having thus called the attention of all 
officers and soldiers of the militia to the observance of their several 
duties, at this eventful crisis, the more effectually to meet impending 
danger, orders that all the flank companies, whether of light infantry, 
grenadiers, or riflemen, of the 1st and 2d brigades of the 1st division; 
two companies, viz: the one at Andovtr, and the other at Havrehill, 
of the 2d division; all the companies of the 3d division, excepting 
the two companies in Charlestown; four companies of the ith division; 
five companies of the 5th division; eight companies of the 7th divi- 
sion; and two companies of the 9ih division, do immediately march 
to the town of Boston, unless (in the mean time, J otherwise directed. 
Each company will march to its place of destination by itself, without 
waiting for any other corns. 

These companies, when assembled, will be arranged into regi- 
rnenn, or -, as circumstances may dictate; and with the ad- 

dition ( . iwelvt companies ol artillery, will form the elite > or advance 
ps of the Massachusetts' militia. The field officers to command 
the regiments, and a general officer to command the whole, will here- 
ter be designated in general orders. The several companies of artil- 
lery Ic be annexed to the advance corps, will be furnished by the follow- 
ing di\ isions, viz: two companies from the 1st brigade, and one com- 
i\ from the 2d brigade of the 3d division; four,comp,mies from 
the iih divisi >n; one company from the ;>th division; and four com- 
panies fiom the ?th division. 

Bi ov< mentioned companies, the commander in chief 

orders a detachment of sixte< panies of infantry to b( immedi- 

ately made from the 4th division,] rop< rly officered; and arranged in- 
to two . : eni , which will march to Boston without the least un- 
necessary delay. Major general Mattoon is charged \\ ith the ar- 
rangement of the regiments. From the 9th division the commander 
in chief orders eight companies of infantry to be detached, properly 
i hcered, formed into a regiment, and marched to Boston. Major 






[81] 



39 



generals Mattoon and Whiton will assign field officers for the troops, 
to be detached from their respective divisions; and the commander 
in chief relies on their experience and zeal to carry this order into 
the most prompt and energetic effect. As soon as the troops shall 
commence their march, each major general will give notice of it to 
the adjutant general. 

All the troops must be well armed, accoutred, and equipped, and 
provided with ammunition, provisions, knapsacks, and blankets, as 
the law requires. The men will be supplied with rations when they 
arrive at the place of destination, and will receive pay from the time 
of their being embodied. 

The security of the town and harbor of Boston being an object 
of primary importance, the commander in chief, while he wishes to 
direct the priucipal energies of the state to the attainment of this end, 
is solicitous to render the militia of Boston itself as efficient as pos- 
sible. With this view he orders the infantry of the 3d brigade of the 
1st division, commanded by brigadier general Welles, to be called out 
by regiments, in rotation, two da\s successively, for the rt ^j'urpose of 
improving their discipline, already respectable, and of enabling them, 
to practise the higher duties of the field. 

This order is committed to brigadier general AVelles, whose know- 
ledge in tactics, and animated zeal in the service of his country, must 
ensure to his exertions the highest effect. The o'der will be con- 
tinued in operation until revoked. The flank companies of this bri- 
gade will be reserved for other .or :e 

The troops called into actual service by this order, will serve 
three months after they arrive at the ultimate rendezvous, unless soon- 
er discharged. 

By his excellency's command, 

(Signed) JOHN BROOKS, 

Jidjutaht general. 



Copy of a letter from James .Monroe, Secreto.i 'J.;/-, t^ his excel- 

lency, Caleb Strong, governor of Massach dated September 

17, 1814. 

SDR, 

I have had the honor to receive vour excellency's letter of the 
7th instant. The attack of the enemy on Baltimore, and probable 
eventual atta - ther places, with the heavy d;r'es incident there- 

to Dressing on this Department, have prevented my answering it at 
an eariier davT 



40 [81 J 

It may Ho satisfactory to your excellency for me to explain the 
views and principles on which the government has acted, in regard to 
the defence of our eastern frontier. 

It was anticipated, soon after the commencement of the war, 
that, while it lasted, every part of the Union, especially the seaboard, 
would be exposed to some degree of danger, greater or less, accord- 
ing to the spirit with which the war might be ■ i. It was the du- 
ty of the government to make the best provision against that danger 
which might be practicable, and it was proper that the provision should 
continue while the cause existed. 

'Ihe arrangement of the United States into military di-trict3, 
with a certain portion of the regular force, artillery and infantrv, un- 
der an officer of the regular army, of experience and high rank, in 
each district, with power to call for the militia, as circumstances might 
require, was adopted with a view to afford the best protection to every 
part that circumstances would admit. 

It was nresumed that the establishment of a small force, of the 
kind statedTVonstituting the first elements of an army in each district, 
to be aided by the militia in case of an emergency, would be adequate 
to its defence. Such a force of infantry and artillery might repel small 
predatorv parties, and form a rail) ing point for the militia at the more 
exposed and important stations, in case of more formidable invasion. 
A regular officer of experience, stationed in the district, acting under 
the authority, and pursuing the will of the government, might digesu 
plans for its defence; select proper points for works, and superintend 
the erection of them; call for supplies of ordnance, for tents, and 
camp equipage; for small arms and other munitions of war; call for 
the militia, and dispose of the whole force. These duties, it was be- 
lieved, could not be performed with equal advantage by the officers 
of the militia, who, being called into service for short terms. w< 
not have it iu their power, however well qualified they might be in 
other respects, to digest plans, and preserve that chain of connexion 
and system in the whole business, which seemed indispensible. On 
great consideration it was deemed the most eligible that could be 
adopted under the authority of the United States; indeed none other 
occurred that could be placed in competition with '.;. In this mode. 
the national government acts, by its proper organs, over whom it has 
control, and for whose enga ; mi nts it i - responsible . 

The measures which may be adopted by astate government. f< . 
the defence of a state, must be considered as its own measure s, 
BOt those of the I nited States. The expenses attending them are 
hai . • able to the state, and not to the United States. 

Your excellency will perceive that a different construction would 
lead into the most important, and, as is believed, into the most per- 
nicious consequences. If a state could ball out the militia, and subject 
United - to th< e of supporting them, at its pleasure, 

. to tha' imp. I and 



£81] 



42. 



die nation be charged with expenses, in the measures producing which 
the national government had no agency, and over which it could have 
no control. This, however, though a serious objection to such a 
construction, is not the most weighty. By taking the defence of the 
state in its own hands, and out of those of the general government, a 
policy is introduced, on the tendency of which I forbear to comment. 
I shall remark, only, that if a close union of the states, and a harmo- 
nious co-operation between them and the the general government, are 
at any time necessary for the preservation ot their independence, and 
of those inestimable liberties, which were atchieved by the valor and 
blood of our ancestors, that period may be considered as having ar- 
rived. 

It follows, from this view of the subject, that if the force which 
has been put into service by your excellency has been required by 
major general Dearborn, or received by him, and put under his com- 
mand, that the expenses attending it will be defrayed by the United 
States. It follows, likewise, as a necessary consequence, that if this 
force has been called into service by the authority of the state, inde- 
pendently of major general Dearborn, and be not placed under him 
as commander of the district, that the state of Massachusetts is 
chargeable with the expense, and not the United States. Any claim 
which the state may have to reimbursement, must be judged of here- 
after, by the competent authority, on a lull view of all the circum- 
stances attending it. It is a question which lies beyond the authori- 
ty of the executive. 

Your excellency will percieve that this government has no other 
alternative than to adhere to a system of defence which was adopted 
-jn great consideration, with the best view to the general welfare, or 
to abandon it, and with it a principle held sacred, thereby shrinking 
from its duty, at a moment of great peril, weakening the guards deem- 
ed necessary for the public safety, and opening the door to other con- 
sequences not less dangerous, 

By these remarks it is not intended to convey the idea that a mi- 
litia officer, of superior grade, regularly called into service, shall not 
command an officer of the regular army, of inferior grade, when act- 
ing together. >io such idea is entertained by the government. The 
militia are relied on essentially for the defence of the country; in 
iheir hands every thing is safe. It is the object of the government to 
impose on them no burdens which it may be possible to avoid; and 
to protect them in the discharge of their duties, in the enjoyment of 
all their rights. 

The various points which are attacked and menaced by the ene- 
my, especially in this quarter, where tiny ate waging, in considerable 
force, a predatory and desolating warfare, make it difficult to provide, 
immediately, for all the necessary expenditures. Any aid which the 
state of Massachusetts may afford to the United States, to meet those 
expenditures, will be cheerfully received, and applied to the payment 
6 



42 [81] 

and support of the militia of that state, in the service of the United 
States. 

It will be proper that the money thus advanced should be de- 
posited in some bank in Boston, that the disbursement of it may be 
made under the authority of the government of the United States, as 
in similar cases elsewhere. Credit will be given to the state for such 
advances, and the amount be considered a loan to the United States^ 

1 have the honor to be, &c. 



(No. 1.) 

Documents accompanying the c mmunication from James Lloyd and 
Wm, H. Sumner , to the Secretary of Jf'ar, dated 3d February^ 
1817. 

GENERAL ORDERS. 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Head Quarters, Boston, July 3d, 

1812. 

War having been declared by the government of the United 
States against Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies there^ 
of, the commander in chief calls upon the militia of Massachusetts 
duly to notice the solemn and interesting crisis, and exhorts them to 
meet the occasion with constancy and firmness. 

\\ hen war is commenced, no human foresight can discern the 
time of its termination or the course of events that must follow in 
its train. But the path of duty is the path of safety; Providence sel- 
dom abandons to ruin those who, to a just reliance on the superin- 
tending influence of heaven, add their own vigilant and strenuous 
exertions to preserve themselves. At the present moment, therefore, 
the commander in chief earnestly recommends to the officers, of every 
grade, a close and persevering attention to the duties resulting from 
their several stations; particularly that they acquire and maintain a 
perfect knowledge of the condition of their respective commands, 
and see, as far as is in their power, that their men are duly armed and 
equipped; that the time allotted to trainings be devoted to the instruc- 
tion of noncommissioned officers and soldiers in the extrcise of arm?, 
and in the practise of evolution, as prescribed in the established regi 
lations; and that the provisions and intentions of the laws being in 



[81] 



43 



every respect fulfilled, they may be ready, with alacrity and effect, to 
defend their country, their constitutional rights, and those liberties 
which are not only our birthrights, but which, at the expense of so 
much blood and treasure, were purchased in the late revolution. 

From the docility, from the good sense and patriotism of the 
noncommissioned officers and soldiers, the commander in chief is led 
to expect a patient submission to the instructions of their officers, 
prompt obedience to orders, and the practise of all those military and 
masculine virtues which adorn the soldier and exalt the man. 

To all the militia, both officers and soldiers, the commander in 
chief would superadd an earnest exhortation, as they are citizens as 
well as soldiers, to cultivate a spirit of candor, of friendship, and 
mutual forbearance, and an ardent love of country, that shall elevate 
them above all sinister views, and eventually secure to them and their 
children, the blessings of peace, of liberty, and good government. 

The commander in chief requires that particular attention be 
paid to the town magazines; that they are fully provided with ammu- 
nition, military stores and utensils, which the law directs; and the 
brigade quartermasters are required to perform their duty with 
promptitude and exactness. 

In such divisions as have not completed the detachment of ten 
thousand men, called for by the general orders of the 25th day of 
April, last, the major generals, or commanding officers of those divi- 
sions, are enjoined to attend to that service without delay, and to make 
and complete the detachments from their respective corps, of their 
several quotas of the said ten thousand men, and to make return of 
the same as speedily as may be to the adjutant general: the said gene- 
rals, and other officers, will take care that the militia so detached are 
duly provided with the efficient arms and accoutrements necessary lor 
actual service. The militia detached by the orders above alluded to, 
after they are formed conformably to said orders, will hold themselves 
in readiness to march, on the shortest notice, pursuant to the orders 
to be given by the commander in chief, unless in case of actual inva- 
sion, or imminent danger thereof, in which case, without waiting for 
such orders, they will march without delay to the defence of any part 
or parts of this commonwealth that shall be so invaded, or in imminent 
danger of invasion; and when in the actual service of the United 
States, will be under the command of the President, agreeably to the 
constitution of the United States. 

And whereas the quota of ten thousand militia required afore- 
said, being to be raised from the several divisions and corps through- 
out the commonwealth, cannot be assembled in time to repel a sudJen 
invasion, and to embody them previously, and keep them in constant 
service, would be extremely burdensome, and even if assembled would 
not be adequate to the defence of the numerous points of a coast of 
several hundred miles in extent; the commander in chief further or- 
ders and directs, that the generals and other officers of the whole 



44 [81] 

militia of the commonwealth, bearing in mind the possibility of « 
sudden invasion, hold themselves, and the corps of militia under their 
respective commands, in constant readiness to assemble and march 
to the defence of any part or parts of the commonwealth, pursuant 
to the orders to be given by him; but without waiting for such or- 
ders, in case of actual invasion, or such imminent danger thereof as 
will not admit of delay. 

By the general orders abovementioned, of the 25th of April last, 
three major generals and six brigadier generals were assigned to com- 
mand in that detachment, without being regularly detailed from the 
foster. The commander in chief, therefore, orders that the following 
general officers, being detailed from the roster as the law directs, be 
appointed to command in said detachment, in lieu of the general of- 
Ccrs named in the general orders aforesaid, viz: 

Western Division. 

Major general Ebenezer Matoon, 
Brigadier general Caleb Burbank, 
Brigadier general Isaac Maltly. 

Eastern Division. 

Major general Henry Sewall, 
Brigadier general John Blake, 
Brigadier general David Payson, 

Southern Division, 

Major general Joseph B. Varnum, 
Brigadier general Ebenezer Lathrop, 
Brigadier general William Uildreth. 

By order of the commander in chief. 

WILLIAM DONMSON, Mjutant Gcmra: 



>• 



[81] 45 



(No. 2.) 



GENERAL ORDERS. 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Head Quarters, Boston, Septem- 
ber 6, 1811. 

The war between the United States and Great Britain having lately- 
become more destructive, in consequence of violations of our territory, 
by the force of the enemy, which continue to menace our cities and vil- 
lages, the shipping in our harbors, and private property on shore, his ex- 
cellency, the commander in chief, orders the whole of the mlilitia to hold 
themselves in readiness to march at a moment's warning, with arms, am- 
munition, a< d accoutrements, as the laws of the United States, and of 
this state, require. Every man must likewise be provided with a good 
knapsack and blanket. Captains of companies must realize it to be one 
of their most solemn and imperious duties, to see the law respecting 
arms and equipments efficaciously executed; but the commander in 
chief relies on the concurring aid of all the general and field officers 
in encouraging the company officers in the discharge of their duty, 
The major generals, and commanding officers of divisions will give the 
necessary orders for an immediate inspection of their several regi- 
ments, by companies. Every instance of deficiency of arms or equip- 
ments should be forthwith supplied by the delinquent individual, or 
by the town to which he may belong, agreeably to the requirements 
of the militia law. 

The officers commanding regiments, battalions, and companies 
of artillery, will pay special attention, at this interesting moment, to 
the state of their field pieces, their carriages and trumbrils; and see 
that every thing appertaining to them is in the most perfect order for 
marching, and for action, and particularly that suitable horses are al- 
ways engaged, and ready at any moment to be attached to their pieces, 
that they mav be moved to any point requited with celerity. All the 
companies of artillery now to be called into immediate service, be- 
sides the requisite supplies of fixed and other ammunition, will be 
furnished by the quartermaster general with prolonges and bricoles. 
The legislature of this state, always proud of its miluia, has been 
particularly liberal in its artillery establishment; and the commander 
in chief promises himself that, emulating the brilliant example of 
Knox, and his heroic associates, in the artillery of the revolution, 
they will be equally distinguished lor their discipline as soldiers, and 
for their gallantry in the field. 



4.6 [SI] 

Under possible events, the cavalry of the several divisions may 
be in requisition. Every motive, therefore, of love of country, of 
honor and sympathy for their fellow citizens, who may be suffering 
the perils of war, will prompt them to maintain the most perfect state 
of preparation, and to move, when called to the scene of action, with 
all the rapiditv of which cavalry is susceptible. The general officers, 
and the field officers of cavalry, as well as the company officers, will 
direct their attention to the quality of the horses, and surfer no man 
to be mounted but upon a horse sound and fit for actual service. A 
few bad horses may occasion irretrievable disaster. 

The commander in chief having thus called the attention of all 
officers and soldiers of the militia to the observance of their several 
duties, at this eventful crisis, the more effectually to meet impending 
danger, orders that all the flank companies, whether of light infantry, 
grenadiers, or riflemen, of the 1st and 2d brigades of the 1st division, 
two companies, viz: the one at Andover, and the other at Havrehill, 
of the 2d division; all the companies of the 3d division, excepting 
the two companies in (Jharlestown; four companies of the ith division; 
five companies of the 5th division; eight companies of the 7th divi- 
sion; and two companies of the 9th division, do immediately march 
to the town of Boston, unless (in the mean time,) otherwise directed. 
Each company will march to its place of destination by itself, without 
wailing for any other corps. 

These companies, when assembled, will be arranged into regi- 
ments, or otherwise, as circumstances may dictate; and with the ad- 
dition of twelve companies of artillery, will form the elite, or advance 
corps of the Massachusetts' militia. The field officers to command 
the regiments, and a general officer to command the whole, will here- 
after be designated in general orders. The several companies of artil- 
lery to be annexed to the advance corps, will be, furnished by the follow- 
ing divisions, viz: two companies from the 1st brigade, and one com- 
pany from the 2d brigade of the Sd division; four companies from 
the 4th division; one company trom the 5th division; and four com- 
panies from the 7th division. 

Besides the abovementioned companies, the commander in chief 
orders a detachment cf sixteen companies of infantry to be immedi- 
ately made from the 4th division, properly officered, and arranged in- 
to two regiments, which will march to Boston without the least un- 
necessary delay. Major general Mattoon is charged with the ar- 
rangement of the regiments. From the 9th division the commander 
in chief orders < sight companies of infantry to be detached, properly 
ofiicertfl, forced into a regiment, and marched to Boston. Major 
generals Mattoon and Whiton will assign field officers for the troops, 
to be detached from their respective divisions; and the commander 
in chief relies on their experience and zeal to carry this order into 
the most prompt and energetic effect* As soon as the troops shall 



[81] 



47 



•.ommence their march, each major general will give notice of it to 
the adjutant general. 

All the troops must be well armed, accoutred, and equipped, and 
provided with ammunition, provisions, knapsacks, and blankets, as 
the law requires. The men will be supplied with rations when they 
arrive at the place of destination, and will receive pay from the time 
of their being embodied. 

The security of the town and harbor of Boston being an object 
of primary importance, the commander in chief, while he wishes to 
direct the principal energies of the state to the attainment of this end, 
is solicitous to render the militia of Boston itself as efficient as pos- 
sible. >Vith this view he orders the infantry of the 3d brigade of the 
1st division, commanded by brigadier general "Welles, to be called out 
by regiments, in rotation, two days successively, for the purpose of 
improving their discipline, already respectable, and of enabling them 
to practise the higher duties of the field. 

This order is committed to brigadier general "Welles, whose know- 
ledge in tactics, and animated zeal in the service of his country, must 
ensure to his exertions the highest effect. The order will be con- 
tinued in operation until revoked. The flank companies of this bri- 
gade will be reserved for other service. 

The troops called into actual service by this order, will serve 
three months after they arrive at their ultimate rendezvous, unless 
sooner discharged. 

By his excellency's command, 

(Signed) JOHN BROOKS, 

Adjutant general 



(No. 3.) 
(Copy.) 

Wavy yard, Charlestown, April Gth> 181A. 

DEAR SIR, 

Your politeness in consenting to receive signals from the navy 
yard under my command, merits my thanks, and may be of the high- 
est importance to this useful establishment, in consequence of which 
I have the honor to enclose you the code of signals, and avail myself 
of this opportunity to express the gratification 1 received on Sunday 
last, in witnessing the ready disposition of the adjutant general of the 



48 [81] 

commonwealth, (general Brooks,) of yourself, and the military under 
your command, tu afford aid in defence ot the irigate Constitution, 
supposed in imminent danger. 

The great activity displayed on that occasion, proves that an at- 
tack cannot be made by the enemy with impunity, even to the out- 
harbors of this part of the country. 

I am, dear sir, very respectfully. 

"Your obedient servant, 

WM. BAINBRIDGE, 

The lion. General Welles, Boston. 



(No. 4.) 



^Lopy.) 



JYavy yard, Charlestczun, April 20, 181*, 

DEAR SIR, 

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your's of the 
19th instant, enclosing to me a transcript of a brigade order issued 
to the troops under your command; the arrangement therein made, 
and the assurances in your letter of the support of three thousand ef- 
fective men, are truly gratifying to me, and claim my official acknow- 
ledgments, to which I beg leave to add my personal thanks for the 
very handsome manner in which you have attended to my requests, 
and to offer my best wishes for yourselt and the troops under your 
command. 

I have the honor to be, 

With great esteem, 

Your obedient servant, 

WM. BA1NBB1DGF. 

Brigadier General fJ'eilrs, Rvstov* 



f8l] 



*<J 



(No. 5.) 

Extract of a letter from governor Strong to general Brooks, dated 

Boston, June 12.'/*, 1814. 

DEAU SIR, 

I have this moment received your letter, enclosing one from com- 
modore liainbridge to you, and am fully disposed to do every thing in 
my power to aid his views, in defending the town and navy yard, and 
the ships in the harbor, so far as my authority, by the constitution, 
warrants; and in the present case I bee no difficulty in complying with 
his or general Cushing's verbal request, which you stated to me yes- 
terday, that a company of militia should be called out to guard the 
approach, by Chelsea, to the navy yard; and also, that in case of im- 
minent danger of an attack, a requisite number of the militia be call- 
ed to lorts Independence and Warren, to be commanded by general 
dishing, as he proposed, and to be discharged when the danger 
'.eases. 



(No. 6.) 

Extract of a letter fro, n adjutant general J. Brooks, to major general 
William A'//2°-, dated Adjutant generaPs office, Boston, July 1, 1814. 

SIR, 

In relation to anv posts occupied by the United States' troops as 
forts, I am instructed by the commander in chief to observe to you, 
that should application for aid, in case of danger from the approach 
of an enemy, be made to you by the officer commanding them, from 
an authority derived from the President of the United States, you 
forthwith furnish the number of men required. 

It will not be expected, however, that an officer of the militia, of 
superior grade to the United States officer commanding at anv such 
post, should be assigned to that service. The idea of two indepen- 
dent commands at one military station is absurd; among officers of 
the same grade, precedence to the national commission w*U be txpect- 
ed; but beyond this I presume the United States' government would 
never expect a concession. 



50 f8l] 



(No. 7.) 

■ .. t. 

Extract of a letter from governor Strong to general Brooks, dated 

Nothampton, July 12, 1814. 

DEAR SIR, 

I have just received the enclosed letter from general Dearborn, 
in which you will observe he requests that the necessary orders may 
be issued for detaching a number of the militia for the defence of the 
seacoast in this state. It appears to me that the danger which is now 
apprehended of invasion, will justify a call of this kind by the na- 
tional government, and a compliance with it on my part. 

General Dearborn proposes to communicate to you his views 
concerning the particular destination of the militia that may be de- 
tached. His suggestion that they should be taken, as far as may 
be, from the vicinity of the respective posts, I think is perfectly pro- 
per. The militia, in that case, will be less burdened, and will leel 
more responsibility; for young men, at a great distance from their 
homes, are apt to forget what is due to their own character, and the 
restraints of a moral kind which regulate their conduct. 

As a number of the militia have been lately called out to detend 
the towns on the coast, perhaps the same men may be designated as 
a part of the force required by general Dearborn; or, if not, and 
others are provided to supply their places, those now in service may 
be dismissed. If you can make such arrangements with general 
Dearborn as were proposed by general Cushing, it will be satisfactory. 



(No. 8.) 
MIUTVItt DISTRICT, No. i. 

Bead quarters, Boston^ Jlugust i'Zth, 181 1. 

SIR, 

The citizens of the town of Duxbury and Cohasset are very de- 
sirous of h?ving some small force stationed, for the delence ot their 
respective villages and vessels, and it is probable that similar applica- 



[81] 



51 



tions will bcmade from other places on the seacoast. If practicable, 
it would be very desirable to have such small detachments as may be 
requi.ed in such cases, turned out frona the immediate vicinity of the 
several places respectively, without the formality of troubling his ex. 
cellency, the governor, on every such occasion; will you be so oblig- 
ing as to inform me whether an authority is, or probabh may be vested 
in yourself, or in any committee, of which you are a member, for giving 
the necessary orders, for turning out such small detachments as I have 
alluded to, say of twenty-five or fifty men, for such places as it may 
be deemed necessary or expedient to afford such protection to? It is 
not easy to decide, at present, or probably at any one time, the pre- 
cise number of places that it may be expedient to post such detach- 
ments at, or the number of men for each. The movements of the 
enemy, and his measures from time to time, must, in a considerable 
degree, determine what shall be proper or necessary to be done on 
our part; hence the convenience of having small detachments from 
the militia made, in the most prompt and convenient manner. 

If neither yourself, nor any committee of which you are a mem- 
ber, now possess such authority as I have mentioned, would not his 
excelleney the governor, probably, think it adviseable to grant the ne- 
cessary authority; any communications you may please to make, in 
feply to my observations, will confer a favor on 

Your very humble servant, 

H. DEARBORN. 

Major General John Brooks, 

Adj. Gen, of the state of Massachusetts, 



(No. 9.) 

Boston, September 6,*81i. 
SIR, 

Will you permit me to suggest to you the propriety of your pro- 
posing to his excellency, the expediency of having orders issued for 
placing the whole of the militia, within twenty or thirty miles of the 
sea shore, on the alert, and in perfect readiness for marching, on the 
shortest notice, and having suitable signals established for giving no- 
tice for turning out and being ready to march. 

We ought not, under present circumstances, to neglect any prac« 
ticable measures for adding to our means of defence. 

I am, sir, your obedient humble servant, 

H. DEARBORN- 

Major General Brooks. 



52 If lj| 



(No. 10.) 

Extract of a letter from general Dearborn to captain Bull, dated Head 
quarters, Boston, September lMh, 1S1A. 

I understand that the major generals of the militia have received 
orders from the governor to turn out any number of their respective 
divisions that they may deem necessary. I would, therefore, suggest 
to vou the expediency of calling on major general Goodwin, of Ber- 
wick, fcr such a number of his division as jrati m?.v deem necessary, 
by stating to him the imminent danger that the public and private 
property in that vicinity is in, if the enemy should efl ct a landing at 
Yoik or Kittery, and requesting him to afford the a d you may pro- 
pose, to be posted on or near the sea shore, near the most probable 
plaoes for troops to land, and to throw up on the most suitable sites, 
some temporary breastworks. It is, at present, very inconvenient for 
me to leave this place. 



(No. 11.) 

Boston, October 1, 1814 
SIR, 

Tn the month of May last, I held a conversation with brigadier 

feneral dishing at that time the superintendent of Military District 
io.l,cn ttit subject of a detachment of militia being called out by your 
excellency, and placed under his command, for the defence of the sea- 
coast, and particularly of the towns and the forts in the harbor. 

In this conversation h« stated to me the incompetencv of the 
United States' troops for manning even one of those fortresses; and 
expressed great b< licitude to have such a number of men furnished 
him by the state, as to stcure the forts under his care from surprise. 
The general at the same interview observed, that he was fully sen- 
»ible of the fed. tigs of the militia officers, in being placed undt r the 
command of l'n;t< d States 1 officers. But, to obviate that difficulty, 
as far as was in hi^ power, he added, that in case of an attack or alarm, 
h,e should immediately u pair to one of the forts himself, and that 



[81] 



53 



the other fort should be committed to the 'defence of the militia; 
which should be subject to the command of no officer of the United 
States' army, but himself. 

In another conversation with general Cushing, some little time 
afterwards, the same ideas were expressed. 

With entire respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your excellen- 
cy's most obedient servant, 

I. BltOOKS. 

Uis excellency Caleb Strong. 



No. 12. 

Bath, June 27/A, 1814. 

SIR, # 

Your letters, under date the 23d instant, are now before me. No 
more of the militia have been retained in service, than is necessary to 
guard the various points and narrow passes on our rivers. When we 
were first alarmed, some of the companies were ordered into the 
forts, which were almost destitute of men, presuming they would be 
more useful there than in any other situation. Bat as I had no in- 
struction that would authorize me to place them under the command 
of any officers of the United States, they were, therefore, when in 
these forts, under the command of their own officers. It is so mani- 
festly improper, that in the same fort there should be officers acting 
independently of each other, that, unless it is the intention of the 
government of the United States immediately to place the necessary 
number of men in the forts at Georgetown, Edgcomb> and Damaris- 
cotta, the most acceptable service they can render the people on these 
rivers, is to withdraw what troops they have; as interested indivi- 
duals, could do no more, voluntarily, than there is now done by the 
United States, and these persons would act at least in concert uith the 
militia. There is now on these rivers more than forty thousand tons 
of shipping; the owners have commenced moving their vessels up 
the rivers; when this is effected, the number of militia out can be 
reduced. But the least number that now will satisfy the people, is 
one company for the various passes on the Kennebec, one on the 
Damariscotta, Bristol, and Boothbay, and one at Wiscasset and on 
the Sheepscut; to the latter ['lace the force will be so much less than 
is expected, that in my order to general Pavson, I shall permit him 
to exercise a discretion to let two companies remain, until I obtain an 



54 [81] 

answer to my letter of 2tth instant, provided he should think it abso- 
lutely nt-cessarv. 

As then? is no other place where there is anv number of vessels, 
so there is no other within my division, where I think there is much 
danger. 

General Payson forwarded to me this day a letter from colonel 
Foote. Three companies on the first alarm were ordered out by colo- 
nel Foote, and discharged with the exception of forty-five men; I 
shall direct the discharge of twenty-five more, which 1 think will 
leave to that section of country about their proportion. That the 
people will complain generally, in this section of the country, that 
thcv have not the necessary number of men, I have no doubt; but as 
the alarms may be frequent, and of considerable coni'.nuance, it is 
better that there should not be too many on duty at the same time. 

I have attended at all the places, within my division, where any 
onsiderable number of troops have been out, for the purpose of dis- 
rharging as main as it would be prudent to discharge immediately; 
and in discharging as man) as I have done, I have acted in opposi- 
tion to the advice ot all the magistrates, and generally a large propor- 
tion of m\ own officers. 

J am sensible that the expense of defending our coast must be 
great; the property exposed is also great at the three places which I 
ha\' named: the shipping alone, is worth more than a million of 
dol... s 

1 shall keep the commander in chief advised particularly of what- 
ever occurs within the district of my command; also of the number 
of troops which may be employed. Should the}-, at any time, exceed 
the number required, or should they oe too much reduced in the opi- 
nion ol the commander in chief, I shall expect to be immediately 
advised. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

WM. KING, 

Major general iith division 

The Honorable John Brooks^ 
Adjutant general, Boston. 



[81] 5* 



No. 13. 

Bath, July 8M, 1814. 

SIR, 

1 acknowledge with great pleasure the receipt of your letter Un- 
der date the 5th instant. To defend the people on the seaboard of my 
division from the depredations of the enemy, and to do this in a way 
that would he likely to meet the approbation of the commander in 
chief, has been my object; it is, therefore, with great satisfaction I 
received the information that the measures which 1 have pursued are 
approved of by his excellency. 

The attacks of the enemy have been so r?»pid in succession at 
various points on the seaboard, as well as in the rivers, that almost 
in every instance the troops were, at first alarm, ordered out by the 
captains commanding companies, agreeably to the order of the com- 
mander in chief of July, 1812. 

These troops having been discharged by my orders immediately 
on the enemy's retiring, and before the fears of the people had sub- 
sided, they have endeavored to get up an opinion that every officer 
acting under the goneral order of 181 I, must be his own judge, not 
only as to turning out his men, but the time they should continue in 
service. This course would have relieved me from a great proportion 
of responsibility, the most unpleasant part of my duty, but the ex- 
pense to the government would have so much increased, that I hati 
not a moment's hesitancy in deciding in all the cases as they occurred, 
— a word from vou on the subject will put ai end to these doubts. 
Since mv letter of the 4th, the Tenedos has left the harbor of Booth- 
bay, and no other vessel appearing there to take her place, Reed'b 
company has been discharged; Potter's company detached to do duty 
as guards on the Sheepscut and at IJoothbay, has been ordered on 
that service, and the forty men which took the place of Potter's com- 
pany on the Sheepscut, have been discharged. 

The enemy having landed at Ilarpswell, and taken some stocl 
from the inhabitants, J have ordered a guard from the company doing 
duty on this river, to that place. 

There is now on duty three companies in addition to the twenty 
men, each from colonel Thatcher's and colonel Foote's regiments; 
considering the extent of coast to be guarded; and that it is indented 
with navigable bays and rivets, a less number, 1 think, could not b< 
relied on to do the duty contemplated. As the measures now to be 



56 [81] 

adopted may be of some continuance, an opinion from the command- 
er in chitf on this occasion, will be very satisfactory to me. 

I am, Sir, respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

J .WM. KING, 

Major general 11 th rltii$::?;_ 

IF:??. Jjhn Brooks, 

Adjutant genera!, Boston. 



No. 14. 

Beffisf, September 8th, «SU. 

SIR, 

Since ray lelter of the yth instant, I proceeded to Wiscasset, 
learning that the British were fortifying Belfast. I immediately or- 
dered out colonel Cummings and Thatcher's regiments, and a batta- 
lion each from Day's and Cutter's regiments, to take up their line of 
march Without d I; y. for this place. X\ hen I arrived at Warren on the 
Gih, 1 received information from Belfast, that the enemy were leaving 
that place, and had taken the west passage, on their wav to Camden; 
colonel Foote's regiment was out — 1 ordered Thatcher's to that 
place, when 1 left them on the 7th in the morning, with orders for 
their discharge as soon as the vessels left Clam Cove, which were 
then there at anchor. 

The vessels which left Belfast, with three others from Castine, 
passed Camden on the 6th at night, and early on the morning of the 
Tth, in all ten sail, in sight of the regiments of Thatcher and Foote. 
Believing that there would not he an attack made upon Camden, and 
as Cummins' regiment was within a few miles of Belfast, I ordered 
him to that place, where ! met him on the afternoon of the 7th. 

I also nut at Belfast a regiment commanded by colonel L lmer, 
who requested me, in the absence of the major general of the 10th 
division, and bci I o deprived of the services of the general of 
brigade, (lil k«,) to i eel the movements of his r< giment, which I 
have consented to, until the pleasure of the commander in chief shall 
be made known to me. 1 shall recommend to the officers command- 
ing regiments, within .'. Blaki 'a brigade, n compliance with the 



[81] 



57 



general orders of July, 1812; and shall endeavor to get such a force 
together as will prevent the enemy from taking down the Penobscot 
the vessels, all of which they consider as prizes of war. 

I have sent an express to general Sewall, advising him of the 
situation of things on the Penobscot, and have named to him that 
two or three of his regiments, if immediately ordered to the Penob- 
scot, to strike the river at Bangor, would be of great service at the 
present moment, particularly if commanded by him in person. 

I am sensible of the very great responsibility which I take upon 
myself, in the first place in leaving the district of my local command, 
at a time when an attack may soon be expected; and, also, in con- 
senting to organize and command troops with whom I am unacquaint* 
ed, and who are very far from being well equipped. 

As no effective movement can be made with the troops now un- 
der my command until the arrival of general Sewall, or a reinforce- 
ment from his division, 1 shall avail myself, probably in two or three 
days which may elapse, to visit Bath and Wiscasset, to put these 
places in the very best possible state of defence. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

\VM. KING, 

Major general lit'i divisian^ 

Honorable John Brooks, 

Adjutant general, Boston. 



Fort Independence, Sept. 25, 1814„ 

SIR, 

Your communication of the 23d, has been received and atten-= 
tively perused. On this and Governor's Island, there are a sufficient 
number of men for manning all the works which are now erected oi 
begun. 

The defenceless positions on Governor's Island referred to, have 
been examined some time since, and works are planned for their 
defence, which 1 shall lay out on the morrow, and cause to be 
erected. 

I shall be very glad to receive assistance from the citizens in 
labor, and should it be afforded, it is desirable that each man should 
bring a spade, shovel, pickaxe or wheelbarrow. If a party could be 

8 



58 [81] 

sent, of one, two, or three hundred men on Tuesday, they can be 
employed to advantage, as it is highly important, that the batteries 
and such works as cover them should be finished as soon as possible* 
On this island, I have laid out, in advance of the southeast bastion, 
a battery for three mortars, which will be finished in three days. I 
have likewise laid out a work for the cover of the south battery on 
Governor's Island, which was commenced yesterday morning; a 
corner to the west water battery was commenced some days since, 
and is in great forwardness. I have received 1500 pikes, from 
the laboratory in Albany, which were sent to the two garrisons, 
by the order of major general Dearborn, for the defence of the cur- 
tains and bastions of the fort, and the parapet of the batteries. All 
the forts and batteries under my command, will, by the morrow, or 
next dav, have an ample supply of ordnance stores of every kind. 

If it could be effected, it is very desirable that the Boston and 
Charlestown seafencibles, should be stationed in the batteries to be 
erected on the east and north side of Governor's Island, every other 
week alternately, with their cannon and equipments. Two mortars 
will be placed on Governor's Island, and furnaces are, and will be 
erected for heating shot, sufficient to supply all the guns with hot: 
shot, which can be brought to bear on ships at the same moment in 
all the works on the island. 

I have directed, and have now making, a new kind of wad, for 
the curtains between Dearborn and Winthrop bastions, which are in 
rear of the water battery on Fort Independence, and for the hot shot, 
which will obviate the difficulties you have mentioned. 

I have this day written commodore Bainbridge in relation to the 
position of the United States' ships, and expressed an opinion, that 
if the hulks are immediately sunk, and it shall be found the chan. 
nel is sufficiently obstructed to prevent the near approach of the ships 
of the enemy, it is advisable to have the Independence and Constitu- 
tion moored above them, to co-operate with the garrison. 

I should like to have a consultation with the committee, who 
have in charge the sinking of the hulks, as to the site. 

The signals which have been established to announce the ap- 
proach of the enemy, are three guns, in the day time, from Fort In- 
dependence and Warren; and in the night, three guns from each fort, 
and a tar barrel lighted on the crown of the counter-scarp, opposite 
the west curtain of Fort Warren. 

To discover the approach of the enemy, a guard boat is sent from 
this fort every night, neai the mouth of the harbor, with rockets as 
signals. I recommend that the troops which are to reiniorce Fort 
Independence, and Warren, on the event of an alarm, be stationed on 
Dorchester Point, in the old work, which should be repaired. Boats, 
in sufficient number, should be stationed there for transporting the 
tioops, which should be sent to the two islands in the following pro- 

ons, \ i7. two-thirds to Governor's Island, and the remainder tc 
i Independence. There should be a large proportion of field ar- 
ler* with case bhot. 



[81] 



59 



You may be assured that every thing in my power will be done 
Jo make a successful defence of the works which I have the honor 
to command. It gives me great pleasure to learn the determination 
of the executive, in relation to the absolute necessity of rendering 
these fortresses impregnable, and you may be assured, I shall be happy 
to co-operate with the military board in such arrangements as may 
be thought advisable for the protection of the capital of Massachu- 
setts, and the preservation of the honor of our common country. 

On the event of an alarm, major general Dearborn will assume 
the command of the two forts, and take the immediate command of 
one, and the other will be assigned to me. 

I am, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

H. H. DEARBORN. 
Th, H. Perkins, Esq. 



(COPY.) 

Navy Department, 

April 27th, 181*. 

SIR, 

The proofs of zeal and alacrity to repel meditated attacks of the 
■enemy, evinced by the correspondence enclosed in yours of the 20th*, 
are extremely gratifying, and ensure the safety of the flourishing 
town on that seaboard, and naval property, which the enemy is so 
desirous to destroy. 

I am, very respectfully, 

(Signed) WM. JONES* 

Vjommodore Bainbridge, 

Commanding Naval Officer, 

Charlestoxvn, Massachusetts, 

v The correspondence between sen, Welles, of Boston, ?md '•om. Bainbridge. 



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